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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

)

Plaintiff and Respondent,

)

vs.

)

Case No. 930640-CA

JOE F. JIRON,

)

Dist. Civil No. 921400242

)
)

Priority No. 2

Defendant and Appellant.

JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of Utah
Code Annotated 78-2-2(3)(i) (1989 as Amended).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The first issue to be addressed on appeal is whether there was sufficient evidence to
warrant a conviction in this matter and accordingly, whether the trial court erred in denying
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss which was made at the end of the State's case.
In determining whether there is sufficient evidence to warrant conviction, the standard
of review is well settled:
[T]he evidence and the reasonable inferences which might be
drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable
to the jury verdict. A jury conviction is reversed for
insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so viewed,
is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable
1

that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was
convicted.
State v. Dunn. 208 Utah Adv. Rep. 100 (Utah 1993); State v. Burk. 839 P.2d 880, 884 (Utah
App. 1992); State v. Salas. 820 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting State v. Johnson.
774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 1989)); accord. State v. Jonas. 793 P.2d 902, 905 (Utah App.
1990), cert denied 804 P.2d 443 (1985).
Second, did the trial court error in denying the Defendant's Motion for a New Trial
based upon the Defendant's regained memory.
In reviewing a claim that the trial court erred in denying a Motion for a New Trial, the
appellate court is to assume that the trial court exercised proper discretion unless the record
shows the contrary. State v. Williams. 712 P.2d 220 (Utah 1985); Logan City v. Carlsen. 799
P.2d 224 (Utah App. 1990);and, State v. James. 819 P.2d 781 (Utah 1991).
Third, did the trial court error in failing to grant a new trial based upon prosecutorial
misconduct. Rulings concerning whether prosecutorial conduct justifies a mistrial will not be
overturned absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Day. 815 P.2d 1345 (Utah App. 1991); State
v. Speer. 750 P.2d 186, 190 (Utah 1988); (citing State v. Hodges. 30 Utah 2d 367, 370, 517
P.2d 1322, 1324 (1974)).
Fourth, did the trial court error in instructing the jury in this matter. A trial court's error
in giving an instruction to the jury present questions of law only, therefore the appellate court
reviews the action under the correction of error standard, giving no particular deference to the
trial court's ruling. Carpet Barn v. Department of Transportation. 786 P.2d 770, 775 (Utah App.
1990); State v. Day. 815 P.2d 1345 (Utah App. 1991).
Fifth, did the trial court error in allowing the introduction of evidence relating to the

victim's anal injuries. In reviewing the lower court's evidentiary ruling, the decision of the
lower court will not be over-turned absent an abuse of discretion State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d
232, 239-40 (Utah 1992).
Sixth, did the trial court error in admitting certain other evidence. Specifically, did the
trial court error in admitting the a) love letter from Norman to the Victim, Shelly Jiron; b) DNA
evidence; and, c) communications between the Defendant and his wife including the handwritten
note. The test on appeal is the same as with the fifth issue.
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The controlling statutory provisions include relevant portions of the criminal homicide
statutes, Utah Code Annotated 76-5-201 and 203 (1953 as Amended),
(1) A person commits criminal homicide if he intentionally [and] knowingly . . .causes the death of another
human being. . . .
Utah Code Annotated 76-5-201 (1)(1953 as Amended);
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the second degree
if the actor:
(a) intentionally and knowingly causes
the death of another. . . .
Utah Code Annotated 76-5-203 (l)(a)(1953 as Amended).
Additionally, the arson statute with which the Defendant was charged, provides:
(1) A person is guilty of arson if under circumstances not
amounting to aggravated arson, he by means of fire or
explosives unlawfully and intentionally damages:
. . .(b) the property of another. . . .
Utah Code Annotated 76-6-102 (1953 as Amended).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant, Joe F. Jiron, was charged with Criminal Homicide, a First Degree
Felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated 76-5-201 and 203 (1953 as Amended), in that the
Defendant allegedly, on or about December 17, 1991, in Utah County, Utah did intentionally
and knowingly cause the death of Shelly Ann Jiron.
Secondly, the Defendant was charged with Arson, a Third Degree Felony, in violation
of Utah Code Annotated 76-6-102 (1953 as Amended), in that the Defendant allegedly, on or
about December 17, 1991, in Utah County, Utah, did unlawfully and intentionally damage the
property of another by means of fire which damage was in excess of $1,000.00.
The Defendant was convicted by a jury of both crimes and sentenced by the trial judge.
The Appellant appeals his conviction herein.
PROCEDURAL CHRONOLOGY OF THE CASE
1. The Amended Information was filed in this matter on May 15, 1992 (R. 40).
2. The Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress the victim's hand written journals on
August 31, 1992 (R. 188-198). The Defendant, through counsel, filed a Motion in Limine to
Suppress Evidence Concerning the Victim's anal injuries on August 3, 1992 (R. 61-66). A
Motion in Limine to Suppress DNA-Profiling evidence was filed on August 3, 1992 (R. 67-72).
The Motion in Limine to Suppress statements made to the Defendant's rescuers after the accident
was filed on August 5, 1992 (R. 74-82).
3. On August 31 and September 1, 1992, the court conducted an evidentiary hearing
related to the motions filed by the Defendant (R. 160-163). The trial court took the matter
under advisement and, on September 15, 1992, issued a written ruling denying only the Motion
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to Suppress the DNA- Profiling Evidence and presumably taking the remainder of the issues
under advisement (R. 155-158).
4. Judge Christensen, the trial judge, denied, by written Ruling, the Defendant's Motion
to Suppress his statements made to rescuers after the accident on September 28, 1992 (R. 338).
5. Judge Christensen denied the Defendant's Motion to Suppress relating to the victim's
anal injuries by written Ruling dated September 28, 1992 (R. 344).
6. Judge Christensen partially denied the Defendant's Motion to Suppress hand written
notes and evidence in violation of the marital privilege by written Rulings on September 28 and
30, 1992 (R. 353, 388-89).
7. The case came on for trial on September 28, 29, 30, October 1, 2, 5, 6 and 7, 1992
(R. 504-520).
8. The Jury returned a verdict on October 7, 1992 finding the Defendant guilty on both
charges (R. 503).
9. The court set the time for pronouncement on Judgement and Sentence for November
20, 1992. At that time the Defendant was sentenced on Count 1, Criminal Homicide, a First
Degree Felony, to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term of not less than five years and
maybe for life. On Count 2, Arson, a Third Degree Felony, the court sentenced the Defendant
in the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term of not more than five years. The prison
sentences on Counts 1 and 2 were to run concurrently (R. 568-69).
10. The Defendant, through counsel, served and filed a Motion For a New Trial on
November 30, 1992 (R. 574-75).
11. The court conducted oral arguments on the Defendant's Motion for a New Trial on
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April 28, 1993 (R. 652-53). After receiving additional documents and memoranda, the court
entered its ruling on June 16, 1993, denying the motion (R. 680-81).
12. The Notice of Appeal was filed with the trial court on July 13, 1993 (R. 684-85).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. Testimony of the First Person at the Scene.
1. Mr. Fred C. Jensen testified that he worked at Ridgepoint Sand and Gravel, just north
of Lehi, Utah County, Utah (Tr. 67, Lines 1-11). Mr. Jensen had both experience and training
in emergency procedures and at one time was certified.

Additionally, Mr. Jensen had

experience in observing and handling bodies of deceased individuals (Tr. 84, Lines 1 through
11; Tr. 89, Lines 4 though 10). As Mr. Jensen was travelling home from work on December
17, 1991 at approximately 5:00 p.m., he travelled past the area that has been identified as the
resting spot of the vehicle containing the Defendant and victim and noticed nothing unusual (Tr.
69, Line 9 through 70, Line 2). As he traveled past the same spot that same night at
approximately 7:00 p.m., he noticed a light off the side of the road (State Road No. 68) (Tr.
70, lines 2 to 24).
2. Thinking that someone was stranded off the side of the road, Mr. Jensen investigated.
The weather was clear and there was snow on the ground, which was basically frozen. The
temperature was approximately seventeen degrees. Mr. Jensen turned his vehicle to facilitate
the shining of his headlights on the area in question. After identifying the object as a vehicle,
Mr. Jensen climbed the fence alongside the road and approached the vehicle (Tr. 71, line 1
through 73, line 23; Tr. 89, Lines 1 through 3).
3. Mr. Jensen observed that the inside of the car windows were fogged. He opened the
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driver's door and observed Mr. Jiron, the Defendant on the driver's seat. Mr. Jensen testified
that it was warm inside the vehicle. With a flashlight, Mr. Jensen saw that there was another
person in the front passenger seat. Not being able to get a response from Mr. Jiron, Mr. Jensen
went back to his car to retrieve blankets and have his wife go for help (Tr. 74, Lines 1 to 7;
Tr 88, Line, 19 through 24).
4. Returning to the vehicle, Mr. Jensen noticed a strong odor of gas. Opening the
passenger door, Mr. Jensen observed the victim down off the seat, covered with a small blanket,
facing the door, with her head and shoulders on the seat (Tr. 74, Lines 8 to 22; Tr. 80, Lines
10 through 19). The victim's mouth was partially opened about one-half inch (Tr. 81, Lines 11
though 25). Mr Jensen did not notice that the victim had no clothing on her, with the exception
of the blanket, until she was placed on a stretcher by the paramedics (Tr. 80 lines 20 through
24). Mr. Jensen observed a gas can under the victim's feet between the fire wall and the door,
in an upright position. Noting that the gas can did not have a lid, Mr. Jensen took the can and
threw it out of the vehicle (Tr. 74, Line 23 to 75, Line 25; Tr. 86, Line 24 to 87, Line 5).
5. Within five minutes of returning to the vehicle, Mr. Jensen attempted to determine
the condition of the female passenger and testified that he got a pulse on her neck for a few
seconds (Tr. 76, Line 14 to 77, Line 8; Tr. 78, Lines 7 to 13). When he checked for a pulse
four or five minutes later, he was unable to detect any pulse (Tr. 85, Lines 7 through 25). Mr.
Jensen described the victim as not having any physical damage and as being limp. Specifically,
Mr. Jensen could not detect any rigor mortis when moving her arms and testified that her body
was warm (Tr. 82, lines 1 to 83, Line 18). Additionally, Mr. Jensen kept trying to get a
response from Mr. Jiron, who was not completely unconscious but appeared to be "out of it"
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(Tr. 77, Lines 13 to 16). Feeling that it was inappropriate to remove either of the individuals
from the car, he did not render mouth to mouth resuscitation or any other first aid. Mr. Jensen
waited forty-five minutes to an hour for help to arrive (Tr. 77, line 23 to 78, Line 6).
B. Testimony Relating to the Investigation at the Scene.
6. Sergeant Jens Horn testified that he was a Patrol Supervisor for the Utah County
Sheriff. At approximately 7:15 p.m., he was dispatched to the scene and arrived at
approximately 7:30 p.m. (Tr. 92, Lines 7 to 19; Tr. 93, Lines 19 to 22; Tr. 104, Lines 11 to
17). The officer noticed the subject vehicle straddling a gully and proceeded to the cut the fence
along the road to allow access for the paramedics, who arrived a minute later (Tr. 95; Lines
11 to 22; Tr. 96, Lines 1 to 7).
7. In examining the area, Sergeant Horn noticed that the approximately 20 feet of fence
along the road and a fence running perpendicular to the road, stretching to the lake, had been
damaged. The officer testified that the vehicle apparently had left the road and travelled
approximately 750 feet without significant braking (Tr. 106, Lines 10 to 20; Tr. 99, line 18 to
101, line 21; Tr. 109, lines 13 to 25). The officer was able to trace the path of the vehicle by
the marks in the snow from the roadway to the final resting spot at the gully, with the exception
of areas where the vehicle had become airborne (Tr. 110, Lines 8 to 20). The officer testified
that it was his opinion that the vehicle was travelling 35 to 40 m.p.h. when it contacted the
gully, where it came to rest (Tr. 110, Line 25 to 111, Line 19).
8. Officer Les Langford, a sergeant with the Utah Highway Patrol testified, testified that
he was dispatched to the area and observed the vehicle at the end of an approximately 750 foot
track from the roadway (Tr. 117, Lines 10 to 25). The Officer observed several items in the
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car including a book of matches that had been ignited and three separate matches on the front
seat, two of which had the heads burned. Additionally, the officer noticed a ladies' handbag in
the back seat (Tr. 120, Line 17 to 121, Line 4; Tr. 125, Lines 7 to 15). The Officer noted
damage to the windshield on the driver's side consistent with a head striking the windshield on
the driver's side (the officer noted hair and blood on the windshield) (Tr. 122, Lines 4 to 8; Tr.
123, Lines 2 to 11). The Officer testified that he believed that there had been a fire inside the
vehicle and that the windows on the inside of the vehicle had a black soot on them. The
headliner, visor and steering wheel had been burned. Nothing in the lower portion of the
vehicle had been burned. The Officer could not tell if the impact on the windshield on the
driver's side had occurred before or after the soot had developed on the window (Tr. 122, Lines
16 to 123, Line 11). Finally the Officer testified that there was a strong odor of gasoline in the
car and that both portions of the separated front seats in the vehicle appeared to be saturated
with gas (Tr. 124, Lines 18 to 24; Tr. 133, Lines 1 to 12). The parties stipulated that the
temperature on December 17, 1991 was a high of 39 degrees and a low of 14 degrees (Tr.
1261, Lines 16 to 23).
9. Officer Langford testified that his opinion from an examination of the car, was that
the speed on impact was approximately 20 miles per hour (Tr. 128, Line 1 to 129, Line 7).
10. Officers Turner and Whitney, patrolmen with the Utah Highway Patrol testified that
there were dispatched to the scene and arrived at approximately 7:50 p.m. (Tr. 155, lines 15 to
20; Tr. 170, Lines 3 and 4). Officer Turner helped in removing the Defendant from the vehicle.
The Defendant initially appeared to be unconscious and then after being placed on the backboard
started to regain consciousness. The Defendant started to speak but was not very understandable
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due to his injuries consisting of burned arms, massive trauma to his face, and one eye swollen
shut (Tr. 139, Lines 10 to 25; Tr. 162, Lines 7 to 22). After placing the Defendant in the
ambulance, the Defendant became combative, wanted to be left alone and had to be physically
restrained (Tr. 140, Lines 12 to 25; Tr. 141, Lines 3 to 11).
11. In their investigation later that night, Officer Whitney observed an envelope and
letter that had been in the handbag located in the car (Tr. 173, Line 20 to 174, Line 23). The
Officers noticed the odor of gasoline in the vehicle and observed the soot on the inside of the
car's windows and the heavy fire damage to the car from the dash area up (Tr. 142, Line 13;
Tr. 144, Lines 12 to 21; Tr. 175, Lines 2 to 5; Tr. 178, Lines 18 to 22). The Officers also
noticed the damage to the inside of the car window on the driver's side and the damage to the
exterior of the windshield apparently caused by objects striking it (Tr. 144, Line 22 to 145, Line
20; Tr. 177, Lines 14 to 21). Officer Whitney also noticed the matches on the floor and the seat
of the car (Tr. 178, Lines 2 to 6). Additionally, there were female clothes and shoes in the back
seat of the car that had gasoline on them. Gasoline was noted all over both front seats and the
back of the car (Tr. 182, Line 22 to 185, Line 4; Tr. 189, Line 25 to 191, Line 7).
12. Officers Turner and Whitney determined the distance travelled by the vehicle from
the roadway to it's point of rest at the gully to be 739 feet (Tr. 146, Lines 14 to 24). The
Officers did not observe any signs of skidding or heavy braking and were able to follow the
tracks in a continuous line except for areas where the tires had left the ground (Tr. 146, Line
25 to 148, Line 7). The patrolmen described the terrain as small "rabbit type brush" standing
eighteen to twenty-four inches high (Tr. 148, Lines 8 to 22). The Officers testified that fifty feet
of fence comprising several posts on the fence closest to the roadway were sheared off and wires
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were broken and other fence lines damaged or broken (Tr. 150, Line 13 to 151, Line 18; Tr.
157, Line 18 to 158, Line 2). Officer Turner estimated the speed on impact to be thirty to forty
miles per hour (Tr. 156, Line 24 to 157, Line 8). Mr. Thomas Proctor, an accident
reconstructionist, testified that the speed of the vehicle was approximately forty mile per hour
at impact (Tr. 1339, Line 10 to 1340, Line 21).
C. Testimony of Paramedics and Emergency Medical Personnel.
13. The emergency paramedics and associated personnel that were involved at the scene
were called as witnesses. Because their testimony did not conflict significantly, it is not
separated. Three individuals comprised the ambulance team responding from Lehi on December
17, 1991 Tr. 198, Lines 2 to 25). When the paramedics arrived, a check was made of the
Defendant who was unresponsive, but the paramedic could hear breathing and had a bystander
support the head to keep the airway open (Tr. 205, Line 18 to 205, Line 1). Attempts to locate
a pulse on the victim met with no success (Tr. 199, Lines 9 to 14; Tr. 22, Line 17 to 201, Line
1).
14. The victim was down on the floor in the fetal position and her head was on the seat.
The victim was wearing no clothes (Tr. 201, Lines 1 to 24). The victim's body at the time the
paramedics arrived was clammy and there was a smell of burned skin and hair (Tr. 203, Lines
1 to 11). The paramedic described the body as "clayey" in response to a query of the presence
of rigor mortis. The paramedic thought the victim had been dead for some time but had no idea
as to the length of time (Tr. 204, Lines 6 to 22; Tr. 276, Lines 17 to 25). The paramedic could
not determine any injuries other than burned hair and chemical burns on her back and neck (Tr.
245, Lines 10 to 19; Tr. 285, Lines 15 to 22).
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15. When the Defendant was transported to the ambulance, the paramedics noticed that
he was fully clothed (Tr. 207, Lines 2 to 13). As the Defendant gained consciousness in the
ambulance, he asked to be left alone and was combative, wanted to be left alone and had to be
physically restrained. The paramedics testified that such an attitude is not at all unusual with
trauma patients (Tr. 207, Line 20 to 208, Line 12; Tr. 218, Lines 10 to 13; Tr. 219, Line 19
to 220, Line 15; Tr. 279, Lines 16 to 24). The paramedics observed that the Defendant's shirt,
hair and arms were burned (Tr. 208, Lines 19 to 25). In addition, the Defendant had burns to
his genitals, chemical burns between his legs and a deep cut above his left eye (Tr. 210, Lines
4 to 13; Tr. 213, Lines 19 to 25). The paramedic noted that the Defendant's face and hair was
burned, but the laceration on his head, was not (Tr. 213, Lines 19 to 25).
16. Mr. Brian Day Andreason testified that he was the investigator that was on-call for
Utah County from the State Medical Examiner's Office. He examined the victim's body at the
American Fork Hospital on the night of the incident (Tr. 288, Line 15 to 289, Line 8). Mr.
Andreason had two nurses in the Emergency Room obtain a core temperature in order to derive
the inner temperature of the body to aid in the ascertainment of the time of death (Tr. 291, Lines
2 to 22). The temperature was taken at 10:05 p.m. on the night of the incident by using a probe
through the rectum (Tr. 291, Line 23 to 292, Line 5). The ambient temperature was 71 degrees
(room temperature), and the temperature of the body was 85.7 degrees (Tr. 292, Lines 15 to
19).
17. Mr. Andreason, in examining the body noted that the victim's hair was singed. The
vessels under the eyelids were red. There was soot on the victim's hands and some skin
slippage about her feet. The victim's back appeared to be burned and had attached to it a black
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plastic substance (Tr.293, Line 23 to 294, Line 7). Mr. Andreason noted only slight rigor
mortis and lividity which was consistent with lying the victim on her back in the hospital (Tr.
295, Lines 2 to 9).
D. Background Evidence and Testimony Relating to the
Events of December 12 to December 15, 1991.
18. Dusty Jiron, age 19, the Defendant's brother, testified that his brother was five years
older than him. Dusty testified that the victim, Shelly Jiron or Shelly Conk, was Joe Jiron's first
wife (Tr. 309, Line 18 to 310, Line 10). Dusty testified that Joe was married a second time to
Dawn after the Defendant was divorced from Shelly (Tr. 311, Lines 2 to 11). It was stipulated
by counsel at trial that the Defendant and the victim, Shelly Conk, were divorced because of an
allegation of infidelity on the part of Shelly (Tr. 322, Lines 2 to 7).
19. Dusty Jiron testified that he was married in Logan, Utah, on December 14, 1991,
three days before the incident in question (Tr. 322, Lines 13 to 22). On December 13, 1991,
Dusty talked with the Defendant who was residing with his wife, Dawn, in Salt Lake. Dusty
testified that Joe sounded ill and under the weather (Tr. 323, Line 8 to 324, Line 16). Dusty
said that the Defendant attended his wedding and appeared to have the flu (Tr. 325, Lines 3 to
25). Otherwise, Dusty testified that the Defendant had a good time and was in good spirits (Tr.
326, Lines 2 to 12).
20.

Dawn Antonsen, the Defendant's second wife testified that she married the

Defendant on September 14, 1990 and was divorced from the Defendant on May 8, 1992
(Tr.327, Line 19 to 328, Line 19). Dawn had one child prior to marriage (Brittney, age three)
and Dawn and the Defendant had one child together (Justin, age one) (Tr. 362, Line 17 to 363,
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Line 5). Dawn testified that she and the Defendant were separated from January, 1991 to
August, 1991 (Tr. 334, Line 19 to 335, Line 2). Dawn admitted on cross-examination that there
had been major problems during the course of the marriage and in fact the couple had lived apart
for most of the marriage (Tr. 362, Lines 1 to 15). Dawn testified that in December of 1991,
the Defendant was living with her, that their marital problems continued and that they had
financial problems of some significance (Tr. 335, Lines 17 to 25).
21. Dawn testified that on December 12, 1991, the Defendant had an appointment with
a dentist. Because the dentist required a payment of $200.00 to initiate care of the Defendant,
Dawn cancelled the appointment (Tr. 336, Line 1 to 337, Line 2). The Defendant came home
at 10:00 a.m. that day and asked Dawn to try and find another dentist that day that did not
require payment and Dawn was unsuccessful. Accordingly, the Defendant ordered pizza and
left the house (Tr.337, Lines 3 to 18). The Defendant went to Dan's Food's located on 4700
South and 2600 West, at approximately 11:50 a.m. and purchased grape juice and another item
that may have been over an over-the-counter sleeping pills, Sleepinal, but the cash register
receipt could not establish the purchase of the pills (Tr. 419, Line 4 to 425, Line 25; Tr. 429,
Line 11 to 438, Line 25). The Defendant returned forty-five minutes later with scotch and juice
and started to eat the pizza and poured a drink (Dawn testified that the Defendant is not a
drinker, and that he drank only on occasion)(Tr. 337, Line 19 to 338, Line 22). Dawn testified
that the Defendant basically watched T.V. and took a bath that night (Tr. 339, Lines 2 to 7).
Dawn left to go to a church meeting at approximately 6:45 p.m. and when she returned at 10:00
p.m. that evening, Joe was coming out of the bathroom-having just thrown up. Dawn cleaned
the bed up, made the Defendant a bed on the couch and the parties retired. Joe slept most of
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the day, December 13, 1991 (Tr. 339, Line 16 to 341, Line 13). Dawn had called the
Defendant's work reporting that Joe was sick (Tr. 392, Line 24 to 393, Line 4). Dawn testified
that they received a letter from the Office of Recovery Services on Friday, December 13, 1991,
requesting repayment of approximately $580.00 for aid when the parties were living together.
Dawn showed the letter to the Defendant, who had no reaction to the letter (Tr. 341, Line 21
to 342, Line 17).
22. Dawn testified that the Defendant had a yellow Mercury Marquis automobile with
all kinds of problems including the brakes and alternator (Tr. 342, Lines 18 to 343, Line 5; Tr.
371, Line 12 to 372, Line 1). Dawn and her father both identified a gas can that had been
purchased by her father when she ran out of gas that fall, which can was found at the scene of
the accident (Tr. 343, Line 17 to 345, Line 1; Tr. 374, Line 24 to 376, Line 6).
23. Dawn testified that the Defendant was a very nice person, pleasant to be around but
that he had a temper that could develop quickly (Tr. 345, Lines 1 to 17). Steve Hansen, the
Defendant's employer also testified that the Defendant was very easy to get along with (Tr. 390,
Lines 22 to 25).
24. On December 14, 1991, the Defendant got ready to go to his brother's wedding and
Dawn went to her mother's house with her children (Tr. 345, Line 18 to 346, Line 4). Persons
attending the wedding reported that the Defendant was happy, enjoyed himself and was not
depressed about any incident or recent happening (Tr. 1256, Line 3 to 1260, Line 14). Dawn
testified that she did not see the Defendant again until the afternoon of Sunday, December 15,
1991 (Tr. 346, Lines 5 to 11). When the Defendant returned, the family took a nap together,
ate dinner, watched T.V. and went to bed (Tr. 346, Line 12 to 347, Line 4).
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E. Events of December 16, 1991.
25. Steve Hansen testified that he was the owner of Hansen Dry wall Company and that
the Defendant was employed by him from April 16, 1991 to December of 1991 and that the
Defendant was an excellent worker. The Defendant was employed in construction as a dry waller
(Tr. 347 Lines 5 to 16; Tr. 388, Line 6 to 389, Line 25). Dawn testified that the Defendant got
up to go to work at approximately 7:00 a.m., his usual time. Steve Hansen, the Defendant's
employer testified that he talked to the Defendant that morning and the defendant was in good
spirits and happy (Tr. 395, Line 16 to 396, Line 4). The Defendant, after leaving for work,
returned home about forty-five minutes to an hour later because he had forgotten his electrical
cord. In the process of retrieving the cord, the Defendant and his wife, Dawn started talking.
The Defendant decided that he was no going to go back to work (Tr. 393, Line 7 to 394, Line
4). Dawn, at the Defendant's request, obtained a piece of paper and pencil for the Defendant
(Tr. 348, Line 9 to 349, Line 18).
26. Dawn testified that at the Defendant's request, she wrote certain matters on a piece
of paper. Specifically, she wrote that she was to pick up the Defendant's paychecks and pay the
Defendant's mother $200.00. Dawn was to give Dusty $200.00 and tell a co-worker, Steve, that
his tools were at the house and that he could have the Defendant's screw gun. Finally, the
stealth gun and lights were to be given to Steve (Tr. 350, Lines 1 to 8).
27. Dawn testified that the Defendant then told her that she could have the house and
all of the possessions and in response to Dawn's comment that the house was not in her name,
the Defendant wrote on the note a clause giving Dawn all of his possessions and the home (Tr.
350, Line 11 to 351, Line 2).

16

28. Dawn testified that the Defendant did not talk about a divorce but only that he was
tired of life and wanted to quit (Tr 351, Lines 5 to 25). On cross-examination, Dawn admitted
that the couple had serious problems in their relationship including the fact that they did not have
sex (Tr. 363, Line 12 to 367, Line 11). Dawn testified that the Defendant then emptied the car,
including the trunk and left (Tr. 352, Lines 1 to 353, Line 2). Joe returned to get a key to the
gas tank lid and told Dawn that he did not want her to call church officials for help (Tr. 353,
Line 3 to 354, Line 6).
29. Dawn testified that she called several people, including the Defendant's employer,
because she thought that the Defendant was going to commit suicide (Tr. 354, Line 7 to 355,
Line 5; Tr. 394, Lines 5 to 14). On cross-examination, Dawn testified that after the Defendant
left, she thought Joe was just going to blow off steam and would be back in a couple of days
(Tr. 368, Lines 2 to 13).

Corporal Les Newren, from the Salt Lake County Sheriffs

Department testified that Dawn Jiron, the Defendant's wife called on December 16, 1991 at 9:31
p.m. indicating that her husband was missing and wanting to file a missing persons report. She
indicated to the corporal that he did not have a weapon but had taken some sleeping pills with
him (Tr. 382, Line 22 to 387, Line 2).
30. Dawn testified that in a conversation that occurred after the incident, the Defendant
stated that he left because there was not enough sex in the marriage (Tr. 360, Lines 2 to 18).
31. The Defendant's vehicle was found abandoned by Park Ro She, an amusement park
located at 820 North Main in Springville, Utah County, Utah, on December 18, 1991 (Tr. 399,
Lines 11 to 24; Tr. 409, Line 24 to 414, Line 12). The car was parked in the vicinity of a pay
phone and, when the car was searched, Exhibit 54, a receipt as well as a sack from Dan's
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grocery (Exhibit 55) and two boxes of sleeping pills (sleepinal) were found. Additionally the
gas cap from that car (Exhibit 57) and the gas cap key were located underneath the driver's side
seat. Additionally, there was a gas can, Exhibit 56 (which was the same type of can identified
by Dawn and her father as being purchased to get gas for the car in the fall of 1991), in the
trunk, which was two-thirds full. The car had three-eights of a tank of gas and was operable for
the sheriffs department when it was driven to the impound lot (Tr. 399, Line 4 to 403, Line
5; Tr. 408, Line 21 to 417, Line 13).
32. After the car was released from impound, Dawn told the Defendant's employer
however, that she needed money to get the car repaired because it was not running (Tr. 396,
Line 19 to 397, Line 10).
33. Testimony was given concerning phone calls from the pay phone located near Park
Ro She, where the Defendant's car was found on December 16, 1991. The call was placed from
489-9986 to 375-2179 (the residence of Ross L. Conk, 1387 West 570 North, #6) at 10:34 a.m.
and lasted just over two minutes (Tr. 445, Line 20 to 447, Line 20; Tr. 449, Line 16 to 450,
Line 6). Ross Conk, the victim's father testified that Shelly Conk, the victim, was living with
him on December 16, 1991 and that the car involved in the accident was registered to him but
that Shelly was making the payments (Tr. 479, Line 8 to 482, Line 22).
34. An Employee from First Security Bank testified that there is a bank branch at 119
South Main, in Springville, that is just south of Park Ro She. Exhibit 79, a countercheck in the
amount of $80.00 was negotiated by the Defendant Joe Jiron on December 16, 1991 at 10:42
a.m.(Tr. 466, Line 19 to 472, Line 10; Exhibits 17 and 79).
35. An employee of K-Mart in Spanish Fork testified that the gas can, Exhibit 19 (the
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can found in the car at the scene of the accident) was purchased at that store on December 16,
1991 at 11:26 a.m. (Exhibits 19 and 50; Tr. 453, Line 17 to 457, Line 20; Tr. 459, Line 13 to
462, Line 12).
36. An Employee of First Security Bank located on 95 North Main in Pay son, Utah,
testified that another countercheck, signed by the Defendant on his account, Exhibit 78, in the
amount of $40.00 was negotiated on December 16, 1991 at 1:24 p.m. (Tr. 473, Line 15 to 477,
Line 10).
37. The victim's mother, Mrs. Carma Carver, testified that Shelly had a male friend
named Norman who Shelly had been seeing. The mother testified that she had been baby sitting
Shelly's two children from Thursday, December 12 until Monday December 16, 1991. During
that time Norman came to her house looking for Shelly who was not present. Norman composed
a letter to Shelly, Exhibit 23, and asked Mrs. Carver to deliver it to Shelly with two red roses
(Tr. 486, Line 17 to 492, Line 16). The letter, in substance stated that Norman was sorry to
miss have missed Shelly; that Shelly was in love with the greatest [Norman]; that plans were
made to meet Shelly the next Thursday unless she wanted to contact him earlier; and, expressed
his love for her and recited that Shelly had expressed her love to him (Tr. 629, Line 24 to 630,
Line 24; Exhibit 23). The letter was found still in the envelope at the scene of the accident with
no evidence by way of fingerprints that it was handled by the Defendant (Tr. 667, Line 19 to
668, Line 13).
38. Shelly dropped by her mother's trailer home located at 295 North 1200 West in
Orem, on Sunday, December 15, 1991 and asked her mother to keep the children a while longer
(Tr. 492, Line 20 to 493, Line 3). Shelly then attended a party with Abelina Hunick, the
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Defendant's sister, at Sundance ski resort for several hours on Sunday night and then went to
Salt Lake for a couple of hours returning to her father's house that night (Tr. 533, Line 2 to
534, Line 6). Shelly returned with the Defendant in Shelly's car on Monday, December 16,
1991 between 1:00 and 2:00 p.m. (Tr. 493, Line 4 to 494, Line 21). Shelly told her mother and
Charles Quillin that Joe was having problems with his car and that she had gone to get him and
get gas (Tr. 496, Lines 19 to 23; Tr. 507, Lines 20 to 23). Shelly told her mother's room mate,
Charles Quillin, during the visit, that the Joe was having some personal problems and wanted
her to help him work them out (Tr. 507, Lines 3 to 23) Shelly took Exhibit 22, that had the
kid's clothes, the kids and presumably the letter and roses and left (Tr. 496, Line 24 to 498,
Line 13).
39. Testimony was given that phone calls from a pay phone located at 300 South Main
in Spanish Fork at a 7-11 store were made on the 16th of December, 1991 (Tr. 440, Line 3 to
443, Line 7). The first call was to phone number 768-8281 (the subscriber was Matthew
Hunick, residing at 9322 West 9600 North, Lehi) and was placed at 3:24 p.m. and lasted over
three minutes. (Tr. 447, Line 21 to 449, Line 15). Abelina Hunick, the Defendant's sister, said
that Shelly, the victim, had called her enthusiastically saying that she had a date with some
mexican and asked if Abelina would watch the kids. (Tr. 542, Lines 6 to 20). When she arrived
at Abelina's house, she was with the Defendant and explained that Joe had experienced car
problems (Tr. 536, Line 2 to 537, Line 15). The record established that the Defendant and
Shelly had continued to see each other after their divorce and calls to each other or visits were
not uncommon (Tr. 549, Lines 20 to 25). Abelina testified that Shelly had told her that they
were going to go "talk and confuse people" (Tr. 537, Lines 6 to 22). Both the Defendant and

20

Shelly were reportedly happy, joking and having a good time (Tr. 542, Line 21 to 543, Line
23). Abelina testified that Shelly smoked and most often used book matches to light them (Tr.
546, Line 1 to 23).
40. The second call was to phone number 798-7285, placed at 5:24 p.m. and lasted
nearly 2 minutes. Both were collect calls (Tr.443, Line 22 to 445, Line 7).
F. Events of December 17, 1991 to the Time of the Accident,
41. Mrs. Geraldine Quigley, a manager of the Super 8 Motel in Wendover, Nevada and
other employees testified that Joe Jiron registered two people at the hotel on December 16, 1991,
sometime after 3:00 p.m. He was assigned room 106. The room was paid for in cash. The
Defendant and Shelly Jiron had vacated the room by approximately 11:00 a.m. on the 17th and
left the keys in the room (Tr. 555, Line 25 to 577, Line 5; Tr. 687, Line 5 to 692, Line 5,
Exhibit 53).
42.

Shelly called Abelina Hunick collect from Wendover at 10:11 a.m..

In that

conversation, Shelly asked if Abelina could watch the kids a little longer. Shelly indicated that
she and Joe were getting ready to take a shower and then go to breakfast. Shelly was happy and
indicated they were having a good time (Tr. 539, Line 8 to 541, Line 1; Exhibit 52; Tr. 450,
Lines 1 to 20; Tr. 547, Lines 2 to 25).
43. On December 27, 1991, the law enforcement personnel involved in the case located
another area thought to be involved in the factual scenario. The second location was nine-tenths
of a mile back on State Road 68, to Soldier's Pass Road and then 1.3 miles up the road (Tr.
650, Lines 4 to 18; Exhibit 2). The officers found a box of cigarettes, a pair of ladies's panties,
a wad of toilet paper and a "gob" of toilet paper, a Salt Lake County Inspection slip in the name
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of Ross Conk (Tr. 652, Line 12 to 656, Line 18; Exhibits 10, 37, 38, 11, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43,
44 and 45). No evidence was found indicating that any violence took place at that scene. No
blood or weapons were found (Tr. 675, Lines 14 to 23). There was no way to establish when
or how the items got to that location or who put them there (Tr. 678, Line 24 to 680, Line 15).
44. Testimony was introduced that the cigarette cellophane packaging found at the
second crime scene matched the packaging found at the first accident scene (Tr. 989, Line 12
to 990, Line 16, Exhibits 44 and 35). No match of the toilet paper portions and rolls could be
made other than they were similar (Tr. 990, Line 17 to 991, Line 22, Exhibits 30 and 38). the
victim's thumb print was found on the package of cigarettes found at the second location
(Tr.995, Line 5 to 996, Line 22, Exhibit 39). No fingerprints could be located on Exhibit 23,
the letter from Norman (Tr. 996, Line 22 to 998, Line 14). In fact, it was established that the
Defendant did not handle the letter (Exhibit 23; Tr. 1000, Lines 4 to 24).
G. Medical Testimony Relating to the Victim and Defendant
45. Numerous references were made to an anal tear discovered on the victim's body
during the autopsy (Tr. 589, Line 16 to 591, Line 3; Exhibit 12; Tr. 599, Line 11 to 601, Line
5). Dr. William M. Palmer testified that the lacerations extended only down into the
subcutaneous tissue. The doctor testified that the lacerations would have been painful but would
not be the result of anal intercourse (either consensual or forced), because of their location in
an area other than the skin area and mucous membrane of the anus. The doctor testified that
they were created by some kind of sharp object. The doctor testified that the lacerations could
not have been caused by a stretching or a blunt object being applied with force (Tr. 1004, Line
5 to 1010, Line 12; Tr. 1017, Lines 2 to 4). The doctor testified that the wounds could have
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been caused when a person was thrown against something that had a sharp object; could have
been accidentally inflicted or the result of a fall (Tr. 1017, Line 15 to 1018, Line 6).
46. The Utah State Crime Lab determined both the Defendant and the Victim, Shelly
Jiron to have "A" blood type and also determined the presence of sperm in both Shelly's vagina
and anus (Tr. 777, Lines 10 to 15; Tr. 778, Lines 3 to 18: Tr. 781, Lines 17 to 23; Tr. 782,
Line 19 to 25). Dr. Henry testified that the deposit of the sperm was relatively recent (Tr. 801,
Lines 7 to 23; Tr. 816, Line 14 to 817, Line 22).
47. The panties found at the second crime scene were found positive for seminal fluid
and the cigarette butts at that location were antigen positive, consistent with type "A" blood,
which comprises 40% of the population (Tr. 802, Line 11 to 807, Line 25; Tr. 821, Lines 4 to
8).
48. Extensive DNA profiling of the sperm samples, established that it was highly
unlikely that any individual other than the Defendant could have been the donor (Tr. 928, Line
13 to 929, Line 2; Tr. 963, Line 20 to 964, Line 8).
49. Medical testimony was introduced that even if a person ingested all of the sleeping
pills (Exhibit 55) purchased in this case and consumed with alcohol, it would only cause extreme
drowsiness and sleep and maybe coma (Tr. 1010, Line 23 to 1012, Line 11).
50. Dr. Leis testified that he performed an autopsy on the Victim, Shelly Jiron, on
December 18, 1991 (Tr. 1100, Line 25 to 1102, Line 14). The relevant findings at the autopsy
are as follows:
A. Minor singeing of the scalp hair toward the front (Tr. 1104, Line 12 to 17)
and singing of the hair along the entire length along the backside, most significant on the back
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side of the head, was found (Tr. 1106, Lines 2 to 5).
B. The doctor noted congestion or lividity on her right cheek and jaw (Tr. 1104,
Lines 17 to 20) and a small bruise (3/8 of an inch) on the left cheek (Tr. 1105, Lines 3 to 6).
C. Petechiae or small hemorrhages were found in her eyes (Tr. 1104, Lines 21
to 23). Usually petechiae are present when there is a low oxygen supply to the area causing the
vessels to become weak and fragile and then any increase in blood pressure causes hemorrhage
(Tr.1105, Line 2 to 18). Petechiae are consistent with an asphyxial type of event (Tr. 1115,
Lines 19 to 25). No bruises to the neck or back or other evidence of strangulation were found
(Tr. 1116, Lines 19 to 25). Dr. Gruwell noted that the quantity of hemorrhage was mild and that
they could be caused by choking or any serious attempt to obtain oxygen (Tr.1282, Line 19 to
1288, Line 1).
D. Soot was found underneath the victim's nose (Tr. 1104, Line 24 to 1105, Line
2), and on the back of her fingers (Tr. 1162, Line 8 to 1163, Line 15).
E. Skin slippage due to heat or gasoline was found beneath her right armpit, left
thigh, upper back, buttocks and ankle (Tr. 1105, Lines 7 to 25, Tr. 1106, Lines 5 to 21). The
burns or slippage were not life threatening (Tr. 1107, Lines 1 to 10). Microscopic examination
revealed no response by the body such as bleeding, inflammation or the like to the injury site
consistent with the injuries occurring after death (Tr. 1107, Line 11 to 1108, Line 25). A
elliptical piece was skin found in the vehicle underneath the dash which matched an area on her
left buttocks. The doctor surmised that the skin was loosened by the application of gasoline after
death and then a loosening of the skin that would cause it to come off at the time of impact (Tr.
1109, Line 12 to 1110, Line 20). The doctor admitted that it was very hard for him to determine
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if the gasoline came into contact with the body before, at or after the time of death (Tr. 1160
Lines 20 to 24). Dr. Gruwell disagreed. He testified that the skin found on the dashboard was
consistent with a person getting burned, and falling against the dashboard (Tr.1293, Lines 13
to 24). Dr. Gruwell testified that the skin slippage could be characterized as blistering. The
doctor testified that there were a combination of blisters that were still intact and some that were
denuded (blisters that had formed and ruptured with a well vascularized base underneath the
blister). The doctor testified that the blistering process that was well in place on Shelly's body
requires metabolic energy to occur in that it is an active body function (Tr. 1288, Line 2 to
1292, Line 7). Dr. Gruwell testified that Shell Jiron had to be alive when the thermal injury
occurred because of the presence of a blister and evidence of very active vascularization or
reddening at the site of the blister evidencing the body's attempt to provide blood and nutrients
to the area (Tr. 1292, Lines 8 to 24). In rebuttal testimony, Doctor Leis disagreed and testified
that blisters could form in dead bodies but did admit that the blisters could have occurred before
or after death (Tr. 1367, Line 15 to 1369, Line 18; Tr. 1373, Line 14 to 1374, Line 25).
F. Injuries surrounding the anus were documented were again introduced as part
of the autopsy testimony (Tr. 1106, Lines 22 to 25). Specifically, bruises about and around the
anus with superficial tears were noted. Microscopic examination indicated the presence of
hemorrhage and the inflammatory process indicating the injury was sustained three to four hours
before death (Tr. 1110, Line 21 to 114, Line 4). The doctor surmised the injury was due to
sexual activity but caused by an object such as a fist with a ring (Tr. 1114, Line 12 to 1115,
Line 10). None of the injuries to the anus were at all life threatening (Tr. 1164, Line 17 to
1169, Line 2). Dr. Gruwell testified that the injuries could have been sustained in the automobile
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accident (on the gear shift) or earlier (Tr. 1304, Lines 5 to 23).
F. A gray color swipe or streak pattern was found on the side of the chest and
right elbow (Tr. 1105, Lines 7 to 18).
G. The doctor observed a dark brown material adhering to the right thigh and
abrasions to the left shin (Tr. 1105, Lines 17 to 24).
H. A patch of soot, a quarter of an inch square, was located by the vocal cords
with no finding of soot in the trachea or bronchi or localized swelling (Tr. 1117, Line 7 to 1119,
Line 17). Dr. Gruwell testified that the location of the soot fragment in the epiglottis presumed
a respiratory effort to inhale air to get the fragment lodged down into that part of the trachea.
Dr. Gruwell testified that the chances of the fragment sliding down the throat with saliva were
remote at best. He supported his opinion by the fact that no saliva was found in that location
(Tr. 1193, Line 23 to 1196, Line 1). Dr. Gruwell testified that because an inhalation would have
been necessary to ingest the fragment, it was his opinion that Shelly Jiron was alive at the time
the fragment became lodged (Tr. 1298, Lines 10 to 16).
I. Blood clots outside the rib cage with no reciprocal bruises were found, which
corresponded to the swipes on the left side of the body identified above. No rib fractures were
found and the doctor postulated that the finding was consistent with her body impacting the dash.
Because of the absence of bruising, the doctor testified that the injury occurred after death (Tr.
1121, Line 18 to 1123, Line 13).
J. The doctor noted no injury to the neck and back externally, but internally
found recent hemorrhage present in the paraspinal muscles located on both sides of the backbone
from the third cervical vertebrae to the first thoracic vertebra. The doctor testified that the
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injury could have been caused by a blunt object that would not cause bruising or abrasions or
from someone pushing or squeezing the area.

Under microscopic examination the doctor

observed the presence of recent hemorrhage and concluded that the injury was, as with the anal
injuries was done three to four hours before death (Tr.1123, Line 16 to 1126, Line 3). On
cross-examination the doctor admitted that the victim was alive when the injuries in the neck
area were suffered. If done while alive, the doctor admitted that the injury could be caused by
the trauma of the crash (Tr. 1169, Line 25 to 1170 Line 24). The doctor testified unequivocally
that the injuries were not life threatening (Tr. 1170, Lines 22 to 24). Doctor Gruwell testified
that the injury could easily have been caused by a car going forty miles per hour over rough
terrain. That injury together with the chest injuries are often seen in auto accident cases (Tr.
1302, Line 3 to 1303, Line 9).
K. The doctor found no superinflation of the lungs or accumulation of mucous
consistent with an asthma attack (Tr.1119, Line 14 to 1121, Line 13). The level of carbon
monoxide was less than 10% which was normal, but there was evidence of toluene and xylene
in the vitreous fluid of the eye, indicating that the victim inhaled gasoline vapors that entered
her blood stream while she was alive (Tr. 1127, Line 19 to 1128, Line 17; Tr. 1172, Line 10
to 1174, Line 10). Dr. Gruwell agreed that the chemicals were an indication of the inhalation
of gasoline and the fact the levels were low indicated that they had been dissipated by respiration
and were at that level at the time of death (Dr. Gruwell noted that the chemicals dissipate very
quickly and that was the reason the chemicals were not found in Mr. Jiron's blood (Tr. 1305,
Line 3 to 1308, Line 25).
51. Doctor Leis concluded that the cause of death was asphyxia. The mechanism of that
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process is something the doctor did not know and could not determine from the evidence (Tr.
1186, Lines 3 to 12). The doctor testified that the predeath injuries were hemorrhages to the
back of the neck, the injury surrounding the anus and the hemorrhage or petechiae in the eyes.
The postdeath injuries were the slippage of the skin (Tr. 1128, Line 18 to 1129, Line 12). None
of the typical findings of strangulation were found including petechial hemorrhage in the oral
mucosa, bruising and marks around the neck, tracheal damage or other indentations (Tr. 1148,
Line 7 to 1152, Line 3). None of the injuries individually or cumulatively were life threatening
according to Doctor Leis (Tr. 1168, Line 16 to 1169, Line 2). Dr. Gruwell testified that choking
is caused by a substance being ingested, going by the oral pharynx and the posterior throat,
getting past the epiglottis and then being introduced into the trachea. When that happens, the
body reacts by the coughing mechanism to try to expel the substance. During this process, a
spasm of the epiglottis can occur where it contracts to it's maximal state closing the area over
the trachea. The soot in this case could have produced that response which would have been
life threatening and would have produced anoxia. Then upon death or serious brain damage,
the brain ceases sending out neuro causing the organ to relax and return to it's normal position
(Tr. 1296, Line 2 to 1299, Line 19). Dr. Gruwell testified that the reason no additional soot
was found was because the victim choked, causing a spasm of the epiglottis, where the victim
struggled for air for three to seven minutes, causing brain damage and ultimately stoppage of
the heart (Tr. 1300, Line 1 to 25). That process, Dr. Gruwell testified, is consistent with the
finding by Mr. Jensen of a pulse in the carotid artery. At that time the breathing function had
ceased and the lower portion of the brain was still prompting the heart to beat for a period of
time after respiration had ceased (Tr. 1301, Line 10 to 1302, Line 2). Dr. Gruwell testified that
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since graduating from medical school in 1975 he had seen wounds perpetrated by violence and
none of the evidence would lead him to believe that violence was perpetrated on the Shelly, Jiron
(Tr. 1309, Line 13 to 1312, Line 14). In rebuttal, Dr. Leis testified that the absence of more
soot and materials along the trachea or reaction of tissue to hot air led him to believe there was
no spasm but conceded that he had never observed a laryngeal spasm (Tr. 1369, Line 19 to
1372, Line 13; Tr. 1374, Line 18 to 1375, Line 23).
52. As to the length of time the body had been dead at the time of the examination at
American Fork Hospital on December 17, 1991 at 10:05 where a core temperature reading of
85.7 degrees was made, the doctor testified the death occurred eight and a half hours earlier,
give or take an hour (Tr. 1129, Line 13 to 1131, Line 6). When confronted with the testimony
of Mr. Jensen, who said that upon arriving at the scene, he felt a pulse and the body was warm,
the doctor testified that he would have to take that evidence as more reliable (Tr. 1177, Line 7
to 1178, Line 22). Doctor Gruwell questioned the propriety of the using the Synergy rectal
temperature probe in the manner employed by the nurses of the American Fork Hospital and
questioned the correctness of the reading obtained (Tr. 1268, Line 8 to 1272, Line 25).
Additionally, given the outside temperature on the night of the accident, the fact the victim was
wearing no clothing, Dr. Gruwell testified that the loss of heat would exceed 1 and one-half
degrees an hour (Tr. 1273, Line 1 to 1275, Line 7).
H. Testimony Relating to the Investigation of the Fire in the Vehicle.
53. Brent Halladay, employed in the office of the Utah State Fire Marshall, testified
concerning his investigation. When he arrived at the scene on the evening of December 17,
1991, he found the car windows were rolled up and intact with the exception of cracks in the
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front windshield and had a light soot residue (Tr. 1030, Line 1 to 1031, Line 4). The vehicle
ignition was still in the "on" position and the car fan and door chime activated (Tr. 1033, Line
16 to 1034, Line 5). Gasoline was found in the back seat, directly behind the passenger seat.
The back rest of the passenger front seat was laid back as far as possible and the lower twothirds of that back rest were saturated with gasoline. The carpet and pad directly in front of the
passenger seat was saturated as well as the center console which had splatters. There was also
some small saturation on the inside of the driver's seat, on the lower bottom cushion. No other
gas saturation was found (Tr. 1034, Line 6 to 1036, Line 8).
54. As it relates to burn damage, there was a little sooting on the dash, but basically very
minimal burning and light scorching. The velour covering of the headliner had been burned.
The upper portion of the passenger and driver's seat showed scorching (Tr. 1036, Line 9 to
1037, Line 18).
55.

Mr. Halladay testified that the flammable limits of gasoline compared to the

percentage of air is one to seven percent. Given the amount of gas poured and the fact that the
windows were rolled up, Mr. Halladay indicated that it would be hard to ignite the inside of the
car but because gas is heavier than air, and the fact that the defroster was running, it would be
lit easier closer to the top of the car than seat level (Tr. 1040, Line 18 to 1043, Line 6).
56. Mr. Halladay testified that the fire was intentionally set. Specifically, he testified
that the driver with the gas can in his right hand started pouring gas in the back seat which was
facilitated by the passenger seat back being reclined. The gas can was brought forward, pouring
gasoline into the passenger seat and on to the floor area, splattering some on the inside of the
passenger seat, center area and driver's seat (Tr. 1043, Line 11 to 1045, Line 9).
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57. A book of matches with ten matches expended was found on the floor on the driver's
side which was completely burned. Two burnt matches were found on the floor by the driver's
seat. Two burnt matches and one unburnt were found on the driver's seat. From the evidence
relating to the matches, Mr. Halladay testified that attempts were made to light the fire which
finally succeeded as the defroster injected more air in the car to dilute the concentration of gas
vapors. The fire extinguished quickly. Mr. Halladay testified that the fire occurred before
impact because the driver's impact against the front windshield wiped soot off the window
indicating that the soot was on the window before the final impact of the driver's head with the
windshield (Tr. 1043, Line 7 to 1051, Line 12; Tr. 1055, Lines 17 to 25; Tr. 1061, Line 16 to
1062, Line 5).
58. Mr. Halladay conceded that there was nothing by which he could date when the
matches were ignited and had to assume they were lit around when the fire in the automobile
was started (Tr. 1058, Line 18 to 1059, Line 19). A cigarette lighter was introduced as being
found in the vehicle when it was searched. Mr. Halladay testified that the search at the scene
failed to uncover a lighter of any kind despite his careful search. Additionally, the lighter that
was found was in the victim's purse and was not subjected to any testing as to fingerprints or
as a source of the source of the start of the fire in the vehicle (Tr.982, Line 3 to 987, Line 17;
1059, Line 20 to 1060, Line 19). Additionally, the matches that were found that were not
ignited were never sent for testing or to obtain a fingerprint comparison (Tr. 1061, Line 13 to
1068, Line 2).
59. Mr. Halladay testified that with gasoline vapors, it takes only one quarter of one
millijoule of electricity to ignite a fire. He testified that the static obtained walking across a
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wool rug used to shock another person created 10 milijoules of electricity, forty times the
amount necessary to ignite gasoline vapors. The turning of a switch sometimes creates enough
to ignite vapors (Tr. 1062, Line 17 to 1064, Line 3). Even the static from taking a wool
sweater off could ignite the fire (Tr. 1091, Lines 15 to 20). The car was never examined in a
garage or laboratory. No instruments were used to test the circuitry in the car either under the
hood or within the dash of the vehicle (Tr. 1065, Line 3 to 1066, Line 25). Mr. Halladay did
not reconstruct the accident and determine the forces at play as the car careened down the ravine
(Tr. 1074, Line 25 to 1075, Line 15). The fogging of the windows caused by the spillage of
gasoline on a cold night also was not considered (Tr. 1077, Line 24 to 1078, Line 12). Mr.
Halladay did testify that the passenger floor mat, found on the passenger side appeared to be
chemically affected by exposure to gasoline for a considerable period of time (Tr. 1096, Line
16 to 1098, Line 18).
60. Mr. Halladay testified that the fire lasted for under a minute and that the deprivation
of oxygen was the cause of the extinguishment of the fire. The lowering of the oxygen content
in the air to twelve to fifteen percent, which is necessary to extinguish a fire is the same limit
that is inadequate to support human life and cause a person to go unconscious, twelve to fifteen
percent (Tr. 1081, Line 3 to 1082, Line 25).
61. Mr. Proctor, the accident reconstructionist testified that the vehicle was traveling
over forty miles per hour when it left the roadway. Given the fact that there were no restraints
used by the occupants, Mr. Proctor testified that the only person that could have stayed in the
seat was the driver because he had the steering wheel to hold. Anything else including persons,
baggage, cans would be flying around the interior. Mr. Proctor testified that his reconstruction
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revealed that the spill pattern found in this case could have been duplicated by the track of the
car off the road to it's final resting spot with the gas can jostling about. Additionally, he
surmised that the gas could have spilled in the back seat and before they can on the side of the
road, the gas ignites causing the accident (Tr. 1347, Line 5 to 1358, Line 19).
H. The Defendant's Background, Amnesia and Recollection of the Critical Events.
62. The Defendant was born on February 3, 1968, and was twenty-three at the time of
the alleged crime. The Defendant had resided in Utah all his life and was one of thirteen
children. The defendant had made his living in construction and most recently, been involved
in drywall and metal stud framing. Mr. Jiron completed the ninth grade (Tr. 1206, Line 23 to
1209, Line 6).
63. The Defendant had met the victim, Shelly Conk or Jiron when she was nine years
of age at a church gathering. Mr. Jiron started to date Shelly when he was fifteen and she was
fourteen. They were married when she was sixteen years of age and Joe was seventeen. The
parties had two children, Dana, age six; and David, age three and a half (Tr. 1210, Line 1 to
1212, Line 1).
64. The parties separated in November or December of 1988 and divorced in July of
1989 (Tr. 1212, Lines 1 to 16). During the period of their separation, Shelly and the defendant
met and had sex on one occasion (Tr. 1212, Line 1 to 1213, Line 25).
65. The Defendant then married Dawn Antonsen on September 14, 1990, and there was
one child born as issue of that marriage, to wit: Brittany Lee Jiron (Tr. 1214, Lines 1 to 16).
The defendant and Dawn lived together for about three or four months. In approximately
January of 1991, the parties separated. When the Defendant purchased a home in October of
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1991, Dawn and the defendant started seeing each other again (Tr. 1216, Line 8 to 1217, Line
13). The Defendant testified that the problems in the relationship included the fact that there was
no physical contact between them (Tr. 1217, Line 17 to 1218, Line 1). The defendant testified
that the financial problems were not significant. He had planned and was able to finance a home
around the obligations he had (Tr. 1218, Line 2 to 1219, Line 8).
66. The parties stipulated that if called, Dr. Jeffrey Stoffal, the director of the University
of Utah Burn Center would testify that the defendant, Joe Jiron, was treated with medication
which has a common side effect of producing memory loss; that the defendant received a
concussion and that memory loss would be expected with that injury; and, the traumatic nature
and extent of the injuries suffered by the defendant contributed to his memory loss (Tr. 1262,
Lines 3 to 18). The defendant testified that he had no memory of the incident and particularly
the events of December 16 and 17, 1991. Additionally, memory of other aspects of his life was
also affected (Tr. 1219, Line 19 to 1220, Line 25).
67. As to the week before the incident, the defendant remembers having a toothache that
had plagued him since April of 1991 (Tr. 1221, Lines 7 to 23). The defendant remembered the
bill from the Office of Recovery services in the approximate amount of $500.00 but, as testified
to by Dawn Jiron, was not upset about it (Tr. 1222, Lines 2 to 13). The Defendant testified that
he found the bottle of scotch he purchased. He testified that was the first bottle he had bought
since buying the house and that there was only two or three shots missing from the bottle (Tr.
1222, Line 14 to 1223, Line 2). The defendant remembered being ill before his brother's
wedding with an ailment in his inner ear that causes him to lose equilibrium. He testified that
he did not recall buying sleeping pills but would have purchased anything that might have helped
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with his condition.
68. The defendant remembers attending his brother's wedding and some of the events
he participated in and remembers having a good time. However, the defendant does not recall
going back home, the event of Sunday, going to work on Monday or writing or signing the
paper regarding his possessions and the house with Dawn. The defendant had no memory of
buying another gas can or the events at K-Mart (Tr.1229, Line 20 to 1234, Line 7). The
defendant testified that if he was in the Springville area and had car problems, he would call him
mother first and then Shelly for help (Tr. 1233, Line 19 to 1234, Line 9).
69. The Defendant gave a video taped statement of his recollection of the facts giving
rise to the accident while still in the burn unit at the University of Utah Hospital, suffering from
his injuries. A transcript of that statement was read to the jury. In it, the Defendant stated that
his only memory was as he was pulling out of the driveway at his home in Kearns. The
statement contained the Defendant's frustration in seeing his children and a statement that he got
especially angry in October, 1991 because of the complications and slammed the phone down,
smashed a ceramic piece and punched holes in the couch and closet and then cooled down.
Additionally the Defendant stated that he and a friend, Ed Hunter had both made comments that
if their ex-wives were dead, it would be easier on both of them. The Defendant answered that
his relationship with Shelly was such that they had sex on occasion and both were willing to help
the other out. Additionally, the Defendant stated that there had been prior encounters in the car
with Shelly and that in those sexual encounters, she would occasionally take off her clothes and
was not always in a hurry to put them back on. The Defendant did not recall having anal sex
with her. The defendant did not have an explanation of her death and denied entertaining
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thoughts of suicide (Tr. 720, Line 1 to 762, Line 11).
70. The defendant testified that he had a myriad of problems with his 1978 Mercury
automobile. The car would cut out, the headlights would turn off while the car was operating
and the engine had to be partially rebuilt. The defendant remembered his father-in-law buying
a gas can but also remembered that the funnel on the can did not fit in the opening on the car
and that he had to use a funnel that was used for transmission fluid (Tr. 1234, Line 8 to 1236,
Line 11).
71. The defendant adamantly denied any contemplation of suicide (Tr. 1223, Line 3 to
1225, Line 17). Even with the pain of the burns and the discouragement with the scarring and
permanent disabilities, the defendant has never contemplated taking his own life (Tr. 1225, Line
17 to 1226, Line 19).
72. The defendant testified that He and Shelly, during the time of his separation from
Dawn would meet at his or her request and talk about their problems. Joe and Shelly met and
had sex in March of 1991 (Tr, 1227, Line 17 to 1228, Line 10). The defendant did not recall
having anal sex with Shelly but testified that he would if she had introduced it (Tr. 1228 Line
8 to 1229, Line 8). Additionally, it would not have been unusual for Shelly to keep her clothes
off after an encounter (Tr. 1236, Line 18 to 1237, Line 9).
73. The defendant always had strong feelings for Shelly. Shelly was his first love. The
Defendant had known of others she was dating and testified that her dating would not have
caused him any trouble (Tr. 1237, Line 13 to 1239, Line 15). In fact, Shelly had dated and had
sex with other men during her marriage to the defendant and while they were separated and the
defendant's response was to break off their relationship (Tr. 1246, Line 22 to 1248, Line 24).
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74. The defendant has had a number of relatives involved with death or damage from
fire and feared the consequences of it greatly (Tr. 1239, Line 23 to 1241, Line 4).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The evidence adduced at trial was insufficient, as a matter of law, to warrant conviction.
The evidence taken as a whole is sufficiently inconclusive and inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
crimes. Specifically, there was insufficient evidence that the victim died by criminal means.
For argument sake, even if death by criminal means could be established, there was no evidence
that the Defendant acted knowingly or intentionally.
The trial court erred in failing to grant the Defendant's Motion for a new trial based upon
newly discovered evidence consisting of Defendant's restored memory. The proffered testimony
was ruled by the trial court to be "newly discovered." The trial court ruled however that the
proffered testimony contained in the affidavit of the Defendant was cumulative. The Appellant
contends that the trial court's ruling that the evidence was cumulative is clearly contradicted by
the record which has little or no testimony on many of the points dealt with by the proffered
testimony.

The Appellant further contends that the trial court's ruling that the proffered

testimony would not have led to a different result is erroneous. Inasmuch as the new evidence
would allow the Defendant to testify and provide the Jury with a reasonable explanation of the
events leading to the death of Shelly Jiron, the effect on the outcome would be significant.
Additionally, the events during the key time periods leading to the death were established by
circumstantial evidence and the proffered testimony would provide direct evidence concerning
the time periods that the jury was required to subject to speculation.
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Third, the trial court errored in failing to take action when the prosecution changed it's
theory of the case in closing argument. For the first time, the prosecution suggested to the Jury
during closing argument that the victim might have been killed by the fire as opposed to a place
and time hours earlier. The trial court upon hearing the objection by the defense should have
tried to cure the error by instruction, mistrial or the granting of a new trial.
Fourth, the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury based upon the comments made
by the prosecutor in closing argument that the death may have been caused by the fire. The trial
court should have instructed the jury that if they found that death was caused by the fire, they
could not convict the Defendant of Arson which would then be an included element of homicide.
Fifth, the trial court errored in admitting testimony and pictorial evidence of the anal
injuries of the victim. The evidence was not relevant and the prejudicial effect outweighed any
probative value.
Sixth, the trial court errored in admitting evidence of the love letter from Norman to
Shelly Jiron; the DNA profile evidence and the communications between the Defendant and his
wife, Dawn.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT
TO WARRANT CONVICTION OF CRIMINAL HOMICIDE
AND ARSON.
A. The Standard of Appellate Review Relating to Insufficiency of the Evidence.
In reviewing the claim of a defendant that he was convicted on insufficient evidence, the
Utah Supreme Court has established that:
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The proper standard of review for appeals concerning the
sufficiency of evidence is well established. In making the
determination as to whether there is sufficient evidence to
uphold a conviction, an appellate court does not sit as a
second fact finder. It is not the function of a reviewing
court to determine guilt or innocence or judge the credibility
of witnesses. The mere existence of conflicting evidence,
therefore, does not warrant reversal. Rather, the function of
a reviewing court is limited to insuring that there is
sufficient competent evidence to enable a jury to find, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the crime.
State v. Warden. 813 P.2d 1146, 1150 (Utah 1991)(footnotes omitted).
B. The Proof Necessary to Warrant a Conviction of Criminal Homicide and Arson.
The Defendant was charged with violating the provisions of Utah Code Annotated 76-5201 and 203 (1953 as Amended) which requires that the State prove that the Defendant
knowingly and intentionally caused the death of another. Utah Code Annotated 76-6-102 (1953
as Amended) requires that the State prove that the Defendant unlawfully and intentionally
damaged the property of another by fire. Utah Code Annotated 76-2-103(1) and (2) (1953 as
Amended), defines "knowingly" and "intentionally" as follows:
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the
nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct,
when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in
the conduct or cause the result.
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his
conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is
aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing circumstances.
A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a
result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct
is reasonably certain to cause the result.
The Defendant contends that the evidence in this case does not prove the elements of
knowingly and intentionally killing another human being. Utah Code Annotated 76-1-501 (1953
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as Amended) requires that each element of a charge must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
The statute then defines "element of the offense" to mean:
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of
conduct proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the
definition of the offense;
(b) The culpable mental state required.
Utah Code Annotated 76-l-501(a) and (b) (1953 as Amended).
The Utah Supreme Court has determined that the statutes set out above require proof
beyond a reasonable doubt that the death occurred, that it occurred by criminal means, that the
defendant was responsible for the crime, and that the defendant acted with the requisite criminal
intent. Of course, the first two of the requirements, proof that the victim is dead and proof that
the victim died by criminal means, constitute the corpus delicti. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443
(Utah 1983).
C. Summary of the Evidence in This Case,
The appellant has attempted, in the Statement of Facts, to provide a complete outline of
the evidence adduced at trial. That evidence is summarized here.
There is no question that the Defendant and Shelly Jiron, the alleged victim, has known
each other since they were children, having met at a church outing. They had started dating
when the defendant was fifteen and Shelly was fourteen. Two years later, they were married
and then parented two children. Shelly and the Defendant separated, indisputably in
approximately November of 1988 and were divorced in 1989. There was evidence that during
the divorce proceedings and for some time thereafter, there was friction between the parties.
Specifically, there was evidence of restricted visitation rights and feelings on the issue of custody
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and visitation. Despite all of the haranguing on that issue, there was absolutely no evidence of
any violence perpetrated on Shelly by the Defendant. In fact, there was no evidence of any
violent behavior of the Defendant at all.
The prosecution was allowed to go into great detail concerning the fact that one of the
reasons for the failure of the marriage between the Defendant and Shelly Jiron was her infidelity
with the Defendant's brother. Yet, in all of that evidence, the prosecution could not establish
any inappropriate reaction to the affair by the Defendant. No violence was acted out upon
Shelly or his brother; instead, the Defendant simply initiated divorce proceedings.
The evidence introduced by the State established itself that Shelly and Joe Jiron met and
talked with each other frequently, after the divorce, about their problems and continued to have
sex. That evidence illustrates the shot-gun approach by the prosecution. On one hand, the State
attempted to introduce three year old evidence of an affair and problems with child visitation
apparently to establish the Defendant's violent and vindictive behavior towards Shelly Jiron; and
then conversely, establish that the Defendant and Shelly Jiron remained close and were reliant
on each other to help with the trials of life. The evidence clearly establishes that despite the fact
that the parties went through Shelly's affair, problems with visitation and each other's
subsequent marriage or relationship, the Defendant and Shelly Jiron remained close and had no
violent episodes between them.
The culmination of the State's use of innuendo was the introduction of the love letter
from Norman, Shelly's boyfriend.

The State was allowed to introduce the letter outlining

Norman's love for Shelly and supposedly Shelly's affection for Norman, without any proof, by
eye witnesses or forensic evidence, that the Defendant ever touched, read or knew about the
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letter. Even if the Defendant had read the letter, there is absolutely nothing in the record that
would indicate that the Defendant, who was still married himself, would deem himself in a
position to violently react to the fact that Shelly Jiron had a boyfriend.
The State's recreation of the days before Shelly's death does not establish relevant
information concerning Shelly's death. The evidence was that Joe Jiron's marriage to Dawn
Antonsen had been on the ropes since it began. The Defendant and Dawn were separated more
than they were together. Additionally, when they were together, a physical relationship was
apparently lacking. There is no question that on the Friday before the incident, a notice from
the Office of Recovery Services was received by the Defendant and his wife, Dawn. However,
there is no evidence that the amount outlined in the letter was significant in light of the parties'
income or other expenses. Even according to Dawn, the Defendant did not react to reading the
correspondence.
The evidence relating to the Defendant's apparent intent to commit suicide is specious
and has little to do with a motivation to kill one of the Defendant's closest friends. The
testimony concerning the sleeping pills was conflicting. First, the State introduced testimony
that the Defendant might have bought sleeping pills, the ingestion of which were not life
threatening, and took them on the night he bought a bottle of Scotch and ordered pizza. Then
the State offered testimony that when Dawn called the Salt Lake County Sheriff, she told them
that Joe did not have any weapons but had the sleeping pills with him. One has to question what
either scenario establishes. The overwhelming weight of the evidence was that Joe Jiron was
ill and was suffering from the flu at home and when he attended his brother's wedding (by the
way, the wedding of the brother that allegedly had an affair with his wife which illustrates the

42

lack of vindictiveness). Otherwise, he was in good spirits as established by his conduct at the
wedding and the pleasant Sunday night he had with his family. There is no question that on
Monday, December 16, 1991, the Defendant and Dawn had a discussion in which Joe expressed
his desire to give up. The State portrayed that as intent on the Defendant's part to commit
suicide. However, even Dawn, after cooling down, indicated that she expected Joe to drive
around and then return in a day or so. In light of the long history of separations, Dawn had
extensive experiences with their disagreements and separations. Interestingly, no testimony of
violent proclivities or conduct was elicited from Dawn regarding their relationship.
The evidence that is most vindicating and dispositive of the suicide theory is the evidence
that was introduced regarding the Defendant's trek from his home in Salt Lake to the time that
Joe and Shelly end up in Wendover, Nevada. Regardless of the reason, Shelly went to Joe's aid
because she perceived that the Defendant was having car trouble. Although the State implies
that the car trouble was part of some intricate complicated plot, Joe and Shelly visited a number
of people and Joe is seen in Shelly's company. All of the witnesses testified that both Joe and
Shelly were happy and joking, enjoying each other's company. The evidence established a
chronology consistent with perceived car trouble and then a planned trip that necessitated the
placement of the children. The Defendant and Shelly Jiron end up in Wendover and the last
evidence relayed to us of Shelly's perception, is the telephone call from Wendover, on the
morning of December 17, 1991, where she relays that she and the Defendant were having a
great time and that she and the Defendant were going to shower together.

Any serious

depression and corresponding suicidal intentions on the part of the Defendant are not established
by evidence of December 16 and 17 or from Joe Jiron's past. In all of the Defendant's troubles
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with relationships, there was no evidence of any suicidal tendencies.
Evidence was introduced that the car that the Defendant had been driving had
considerable problems. The State had sheriff department employees testify that their inspection
revealed that the car had gas and started. However, within days of the car's release, Dawn Jiron
was at the place of Defendant's employer asking for money because the car would not run. Joe
Jiron did purchase a gas can, even though he had one in the back of his car. That purchase could
have been explained by his loss of the key to the trunk, his lack of memory as to it's existence
or a myriad of other explanations. It is hard to imagine that the Defendant intended the purchase
of the gas can as part of a plot. He kept the can in the car during then entire trip to Wendover
and back and took no efforts to hide it.

If he had desired a gas can as part of some

contemplated action, why wouldn't he have taken the can out of his own car and emptied the gas
in it before Shelly arrived. Careful thought about the significance of the gas can purchase
reveals that it is an unrelated fact to anything having to do with the motivation or intent of the
Defendant.
The evidence established that the victim, Shelly Jiron called Abelina Hunick at 10:11
a.m. on the morning of December 17, from Wendover still contemplating showering with the
Defendant and eating breakfast. The accident occurred on the west side of Utah Lake that
evening at about 7:00 p.m. There is no evidence of what transpired between those times with
the exception of the evidence found at the "second site." It is apparent that the parties stopped
at that location, had sex and talked while Shelly smoked several cigarettes. Again, there was
no evidence of violence or any altercation between the parties. It is at this stage that the State
apparently abandons the theory that the Defendant was suicidal and had plotted to kill Shelly.
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The prosecuting attorney speculated that the Defendant somehow saw the love letter directed to
Shelly from Norman, went into a violent rage and killed the victim. There is absolutely no
evidence that would support that conclusion other than sheer speculation. There is no evidence
that the Defendant had any expectation of fidelity on Shelly's part. There was no evidence that
the Defendant handled the letter or saw it's contents. Further from a practical standpoint, Mr.
Jiron had only walked away from his relationship with his wife the day before. What possible
explanation could be given to support the supposition of a violent reaction on his part to the
letter about a relationship Shelly was having previously. Both had been through the same
relationship problems and maintained their intimacy and friendship in spite thereof.
The evidence from the accident site produced a witness, Mr. Fred C. Jensen, who was
the first person on the scene. Mr. Jensen testified that he felt a pulse on Shelly Jiron's body and
that her limbs were limp and not rigid. The evidence was that the fire in the vehicle preceded
the final impact at the gully, but no one could testify by how far. The only evidence helpful in
timing the fire, is that from Mr. Jensen who testified that the inside of the car, when he opened
the door, was still warm, even though the outside temperature was seventeen degrees. The only
reasonable conclusion is that the fire occurred while the car was proceeding down the highway,
causing the Defendant to lose control and travel the nearly 750 feet to the final resting spot. It
is highly unlikely that someone who wanted to kill himself and destroy evidence would pick the
spraying of gasoline and an attempt to light a fire, in a moving car, as an effective or efficient
means.
There is no consensus that could be drawn from the evidence with regard to the time of
death. There were significant questions relative to the use of the Synergy rectal probe to obtain
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the temperature and significant conflict in the evidence relative to the onset of rigor mortis and
lividity. Dr. Leis testified that he estimated the time of death to be eight and a half hours, give
or take an hour prior to the time the core temperature was obtained, at 10:05 p.m. That
calculation would put the time of death from 12:30 to 2:30 p.m., approximately five to six hours
before the accident. Obviously, that opinion is in conflict with Mr. Jensen who felt a pulse when
he first examined the occupants of the car. Dr. Leis testified that if the person had a reasonable
degree of medical training, the evidence from the witness on the scene would be more reliable.
As outlined in the statement of facts, Mr. Jensen had considerable experience in emergency
procedures and dealing with dead bodies.
The testimony was also in conflict on the amount of rigor mortis. The accounts of the
paramedics and the medical examiner who noted only mild rigor mortis at 10:00 p.m. cannot
be reconciled. Both doctors testified that the normal calculation of time of death derived from
the core temperature would be affected by outside temperature, clothing and other factors.
Inasmuch as no one was able to establish those factors, the time of death testimony is simply
speculation. There is significant testimony that Shelly Jiron was alive at the time of the fire and
the accident. The only testimony to the contrary is the core temperature evidence which was
not only conflicting but unreliable because it was affected by elements of outside temperature,
clothing and the like which were unknown factors and could not be taken into account by the
doctors.
The examination of the body also produced no definitive evidence of foul play. Dr. Leis
concluded that the cause of death was asphyxia or deprivation of oxygen. Dr. Leis agreed that
the mechanism of the death could not be determined and ruled out strangulation, blows to the
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head and other means of inflicting trauma. The doctor testified that all of the wounds and
injuries on the body were not life threatening. In summary, Dr. Leis testified that the predeath
injuries were hemorrhages to the back of the neck, the anal injuries and the petechiae. The only
postdeath injuries were slippage of the skin and on cross-examination, Dr. Leis testified that
those could have been produced before or after the time of death.
There was conflicting testimony on natural causes of death producing asphyxia. The only
theory advanced by the prosecution was that Shelly Jiron, after having sex with the Defendant
was suffocated by him, even though there was no evidence of a physical scuffle at the "second
site." Additionally, there was no evidence of fighting or injuries to the defendant or to Shelly's
body consistent with the movements of a person who is being strangled. It is the Defendant's
position, that a finder of fact, to come to the conclusion that the Defendant intentionally and
knowingly caused Shelly Jiron's death, had to engage in total speculation. Each of the elements
set out above can be construed to fit a number of factual scenarios that do not involve foul play.
The evidence concerning the fire investigation is important. Mr. Halladay testified that
the gasoline spill appeared to be a pour consistent with a person starting with the can in the back
seat and pouring gasoline on the cars seat as he brought his hand forward. However, that
scenario is as consistent with the detection of the gas can in the back seat spilling and an attempt
to reach back and get the can and replace a lid or stop the spill. The State's theory is advanced
by the presence of the book of matches and individual matches that had been torn from the book.
However, no evidence was found that the Defendant handled the match book or matches.
Further, the victim used matches to light her cigarettes. The only lighter found was introduced
late in the trial and the evidence that it had been located even in the vehicle was suspect. The
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State's expert testified that the gas spill in the car could have been ignited by a small amount of
electricity, equivalent to the amount from a static electric shock or that put off by a woman
taking off a sweater.
The evidence relied upon by the State as to the Defendant's combativeness in the
ambulance was neutralized by the testimony of the same paramedics that combativeness and a
desire to be left alone is often seen in trauma patients.
Lastly, there was evidence of the Defendant's prior negative experience with burned
family members, which would lead one to believe that Mr. Jiron would not chose that means
to kill himself.
There are a number of possible factual scenarios that are consistent with the evidence.
A criminal cause of death, by suffocation, is not one of them. Significant machinations of the
evidence has to be made to conclude that the Defendant somehow disabled Shelly Jiron and then
suffocated her, without producing any corollary signs of struggle or injury. This Court has stated
that when the evidence as viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that a jury must have entertained a reasonable doubt, as
to the defendant's guilt, the verdict must be overturned. State v. Warden, 813 P.2d 1146, 1150
(Utah 1991)(footnotes omitted).
In this case, each of the relevant pieces of evidence is consistent with accidental death.
When the pieces of the puzzle are added one to another, there is simply no way that the evidence
can be interpreted to produce one factual scenario proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Shelly
died by criminal means. The entire case is more consistent with a death caused by accident.
D. Prior Decisions Mandate a Reversal of the Homicide Conviction,
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There is no question that in proving that the cause of death was by criminal means, the
State may use circumstantial evidence. State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983). In that case,
the victim was last seen with the defendant. When the body was discovered a year and a half
later, the body was found in a carrot cellar, in a clearly unnatural positions. In that case, the
testimony was uncontroverted that the body was dead when placed in the location where it was
found. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to establish the corpus delicti and that
the position and location of the body supported that conclusion. IcL at 444. In another case,
previously examined by this Court, the appellate court found that evidence that the upper jaw
was fragmented and the middle upper cheek was missing from the body by force.

The

pathologist testified that the force necessary to cause the damage on the face would cause death.
In those circumstances, the court held that there was sufficient evidence of criminal means to
support the corpus delicti and admitted out-of-court statements. State v. Thomas, 222 S.C. 484,
73 S.E.2d 722 (1952). See also, State v. Bales. 675 P.2d 573, 574-75 (Utah 1983); State v.
Crawford. 59 Utah 39, 201 P. 1030, 1033 (1921).
In State v. James. 819 P.2d 781 (Utah 1991), the Court determined that evidence
establishing that the deceased baby was wrapped in the mattress cover belonging to the
Defendant when it was discovered, that the Defendant was overheard to have admitted to the
crime, his concealment and hindrance of the investigation, and the inability to explain the
existence of the mattress cover in light of his kidnapping theory, sustained a finding that the
defendant was responsible for the death. IcL at 784-89.
James then claimed that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of the requisite
intent. Before the Court sustained the verdict, a litany of the evidence establishing the intent
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was provided by the Court. The evidence included the fact that the child was left with the
Defendant the morning of the disappearance; the defendant upon being brought to the station told
the child's mother that he didn't do it on purpose and that he was sorry; evidence of prior abuse
on the child by the defendant; attempts to hinder the investigation of the disappearance; major
inconsistencies in the evidence supporting a kidnapping by other persons; and, the location of
the child in a mattress cover belonging to the defendant and the confession of the defendant to
another third person. LI
Certainly, the evidence in this case is not even close to the evidence accumulated in
James, supra. In State v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1985), the defendant was convicted
of murder as a result of events that occurred while the victim and the defendant were having
consensual sexual intercourse.

It was established that the defendant and the victim were

intoxicated and that the electrical cord attached to the victim's clock radio was placed around
the victim's neck and that the defendant pulled on the cord lightly for a short time. The cord
around the neck was the uncontroverted cause of death. The Court held that because there was
neither evidence of a fight or struggle between the two, nor evidence of any intent on the part
of the defendant to injure the victim, the Court reduced the conviction from murder to
manslaughter. The Court held that the jury could not have reasonably found evidence that the
defendant's act of pulling on the cord was done with the requisite intent for murder. Id at 121921.
In the cases where the Court has sustained a First Degree Felony Murder using
circumstantial evidence, there was always substantial evidence relating to the circumstances of
death and motive of the Defendant. State v. DeMille. 756 P.2d 81 (Utah 1988) (evidence of
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skull fracture while in defendant's care); State v. Fontana. 680 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984) (evidence
that the defendant pointed gun at the victim and shot sufficient to convict defendant of second
degree murder); State v. Maetas. 652 P.2d 903, 905-07 (Utah 1982) (evidence that defendant
pointed a gun out of car window and shot in the direction of the officer deemed sufficient to
support conviction of first degree murder);
In this case, the jury was forced to speculate as to the meaning of the evidence to be able
to conclude both that the victim dies by criminal means and that the defendant acted with the
requisite criminal intent. It cannot be assumed that because gasoline was spilled in the car that
the defendant had anything to do with igniting the gas or somehow intended to start a fire. The
two crucial pieces of evidence, relied upon by the state, the love letter from Norman and the
book of matches, produced no evidence that the defendant handled them or used them as a
means of perpetrating a murder.
Appellant understands that credibility is an issue for the trier of fact. See, James, supra.
819 P.2d at 784; State v. Hopkins. 782 P.2d 475, 477 (Utah 1989); Booker, supra. 709 P.2d
at 345; State v. wilson. 565 P.2d 66, 68 (Utah 1977). Additionally, the jury has the right to
accept the testimony of certain witnesses and discount conflicting testimony. Fillmore Prods, v.
Western States Paving. Inc.. 592 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah 1979). In sum, this Court has the right
to assume that the jury believed the evidence supporting the verdict. State v. Stewart. 729 P.2d
610, 611 (Utah 1986); Stewart v. Sate bv and through Deland. 830 P.2d 306 (Utah Ct. App.)
1992); State v. Singer. 815 P.2d 1303, 1306 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). When those tests are
applied to the facts of this case, the State's burden still has not been met. Each piece of evidence
and element of testimony may be construed in so many different ways, that speculation upon
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speculation is required to deduce death by criminal means and the requisite intent. When, as
here, the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed the crime with
the requisite intent, the verdict must be overturned. State v. Dunn, 208 Utah Adv. Rep. 100
(Utah App. Ct. 1993); State v. Johnson, supra, at 1156; State v. Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29, 38
(Utah 1989); State v. Verde, supra, at 124).,
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED UPON NEWLY
DISCOVERED EVIDENCE.
A. The Legal Standard for Granting a Motion for a New Trial Based Upon Newly
Discovered Evidence.
The Defendant filed a Motion for a New Trial based upon newly discovered evidence.
The newly discovered evidence was in the form of the Defendant's partially regained memory.
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure allows the trial court to grant a motion
in the interests of justice or when there is impropriety in the proceedings. Further, this Court
has stated that when the request for a new trial is based upon the claim of newly discovered
evidence, the evidence must meet three criteria:
(1) it must be such as could not with reasonable diligence
have been discovered and produced at the trial; (2) it must
not be merely cumulative; and (3) it must be such as to render
a different result probable on the retrial of the case.
State v. Gellatlv. 22 Utah 2d 149, 449 P.2d 993, 996 (1969); State v. James. 819 P.2d 781
(Utah 1991). On Appeal, it is assumed that the trial court, who is vested with discretion in these
matters, acted properly, unless the record clearly shows the contrary. State v. Williams, 712
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P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985); Logan City v. Carlsen. 799 P.2d 224, 225 (Utah Ct. App. 1990);
and State v. James, supra, at 793.
B. A Summary of the Newly Discovered Evidence,
At the time of trial the prosecution and defense stipulated that if Dr. Jeffrey Stoffal, the
Director of the University of Utah Burn Center was called, he would testify to three important
facts:
1. The Defendant, Joe Jiron, was treated with medication
which has a common side effect of producing memory loss;
2. That the Defendant sustained a concussion and that
memory loss would be expected with that injury; and
3. That the traumatic nature and extent of the injuries
suffered by the Defendant contributed to his memory loss.
Tr. 1262, Lines 3 to 18. Dr. Stoffal's proffered testimony was the only testimony elicited from
either side on the issue of Defendant's amnesia.
On May 7, 1992, the Defendant filed with the trial court, a nine page affidavit detailing
facts that he had previously been unable to remember (R. 654 to 662; Addendum No. 1).
Specifically, the Defendant testified by affidavit to the following facts:
1. The Defendant had a dental appointment on December 12, 1991. Upon
learning that his wife, Dawn had cancelled the appointment, the Defendant stayed home because
he was not feeling well. While home, the Defendant ate pizza, took a nap and had at most,
three shots of scotch. At no time did he purchase or take any sleeping pills (R. 661-62).
2. On the morning of December 16, 1991, the Defendant called his employer to
find out the job location for the day and left for that site. When he arrived, the defendant
noticed that he did not have an extension cord and returned home to get one. At home, the
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Defendant determined that it was an appropriate time to end his marriage to Dawn. The
Defendant went around the house and determined the items that he wanted to take with him.
The Defendant had Dawn get a pencil and pad so that she could write down the things that he
wanted her to do for him. The Defendant then went out to the car and emptied the car so that
he could load it with the things that he wanted to take with him (R. 660-61).
3. At the time he was preparing the car for the items he wanted to take from the
house, or at a time subsequent, Dawn asked the Defendant what he wanted to do about the
house. In response to that query, Mr. Jiron indicated that his wife could have it (R. 660).
4. The Defendant then left the house to fill the car with gas and fill the air shocks
on the car so that he could haul his possessions from the house. The Defendant, while on route,
realized that he had forgotten the gas key to the car and returned home to get it. After leaving
the house, the Defendant, instead of going to the gas station, started to drive around to calm
down. As he got to Springville, the car began experiencing car problems and accordingly, he
drove to a vacant lot and decided to call Shelly Jiron for help (R. 659-60).
5. The Defendant went to a bank to withdraw some money and waited for Shelly.
After Shelly arrived they went to purchase a gas can and finally located one at K-Mart in
Spanish Fork. While in Spanish Fork, they drove to old homes in that area. In response to
Shelly's comment that she had been over in Wendover, the week before and had a good time,
Shelly and the Defendant decided to go. The Defendant withdrew more money for the trip and
Shelly made arrangements for the care of the children (R. 658-59).
6. Shelly and the Defendant returned to Springville and stopped to fill Shelly's
car and the gas can. As the Defendant filled Shelly's car, Shelly placed the filled gas can on
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the floor of the passenger side in front of the back seat. Upon returning to the Defendant's car,
the Defendant could not find the key to the gas tank and the parties decided to leave his car there
and take Shelly's (R. 658).
7. Mr. Jiron and Shelly proceeded to Shelly's mother's house in Orem, retrieved
the kids and then dropped them off at Abelina Hunick's house. The Defendant and Shelly then
left for Wendover. The parties gambled and drank. They decided to get a room. Joe assumed
that Shelly was still going with Danny Kinder as a boyfriend. Shelly indicated that he wasn't
and the parties decided to get one room together. The parties watched television, made love and
slept (R. 658).
8. On the morning of December 17, 1991, the Defendant went to take a shower
as Shelly was calling Abelina Hunick. After the phone call, Shelly joined him and they made
love again. The parties had breakfast, gambled some more and left. Shelly was tired and asked
the Defendant to drive. Shelly told the Defendant to take the Tooele exit heading south because
it was faster to Abelina's home. The parties made several stops at gas stations for food and to
use the restrooms. The parties started talking about the Defendant's impending separation and
about the prospect of the Defendant and Shelly getting back together again (R. 657).
9. As the parties were nearing Abelina's home, Shelly suggested that the parties
stop for a while. They located a dirt road and turned off. After they stopped the car kept
rolling and Shelly held down the brake pedal as the Defendant placed a rock under the wheel.
The parties talked for a while, then had sex which the Defendant described as "especially
passionate and vigorous with the [defendant] lying on a fully extended seat and Shelly on top of
[him]." The Defendant speculates that it is at that time that the gas can which was located on
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the floor behind the seat became dislodged (R. 656).
10. After sex, the parties exited the car because it was hot and the windows were
fogged up. Shelly use the bathroom and had a cigarette which was lit by the book of matches.
The parties became cold and returned to the car. As the parties started back towards the main
road, Shelly and the Defendant both noticed that the car smelled strongly of gasoline (R. 656).
11. The Defendant reached back for the can and pulled it to the front seat. As
he was doing so, Shelly swore and the Defendant realized that he had spilled gasoline. Shelly
took the can and did something with it. Both noticed that the gasoline was burning their skin.
They decided that inasmuch as they were close to Abelina's house, that they would proceed
there. Shelly was wiping gasoline from her and took off her top. The Defendant then saw a
flash of light, closed his eyes, let go of the steering wheel and tried to reach for Shelly. The
Defendant heard a hissing sound and his ears popped. The Defendant then felt the car tipped
to the right and the Defendant jammed his foot next to the gas pedal. The Defendant was
thrown about the car and lost consciousness (653-54).
C. The Trial Court's Ruling and the Basis for Reversal.
Judge Christensen, in his Ruling dated June 14, 1993, stated as follows:
The Court has reviewed the affidavit of defendant filed in
support of the claim of newly discovered evidence and finds
that for the most part, Defendant's restored recollections
are essentially cumulative of facts already submitted to the
Jury covering the time up to when the car was deliberately
parked on the dirt road west of the main road. From that
point on (Para 48-53 of Defendant affidavit) it appears to
the Court that the now recollections of the Defendant are
nothing more that [sic] an attempt to bolster the theories
presented by Defendant at trial with evidence which is merely
cumulative to that already heard and considered by the Jury.
The Court does not believe a different result would be reached
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on a retrial if the Jury were permitted to consider the alleged
new evidence now advance [sic] by the Defendant.
R. 672.
The trial court's opinion appears to take the prosecution's position in it's entirety that the
evidence outlined in the affidavit is merely cumulative or irrelevant (R. 665-68). It is
respectfully submitted that nothing could be further from the truth.
At trial, the prosecution painted the events of December 12, 1991, the day the Defendant
had the dental appointment, to Friday, December 13, 1991, the day the parties received the
demand letter from the Office of Recovery Services, as dark and depressing days for the
Defendant and that the Defendant was in fact suicidal. One of the pieces intregal to that
portrayal was the allegation that Defendant purchased packages of sleeping pills. In response to
the Motion for a New Trial, the prosecution stated:
Paragraphs 1 through 7 of the Defendant's Affidavit are
completely irrelevant to this case. Rosa Corales specifically
identified the Defendant as the person who purchased grape
juice and sleeping pills on December 12, 1991 at Dan's Food
Store in Tavlorsville. . . . (Emphasis added).
R. 668. In fact, Rosa Corales identified a cash register receipt from the store for that day and
identified the purchase of the grape juice but could only testify that another item from "general
merchandise" was purchased on that occasion. Ms. Corales had seen the Defendant in the store
on previous occasions but could not testify that it was the Defendant who appeared at the store
on December 12 or that the Sleepinal was purchased by him (Tr. 425, Line 9 to 426, Line 18;
Tr. 426, Line 19 to 428, Line 13). Accordingly, the Defendant's testimony as contained in the
affidavit is the first and only testimony the defense had that indicated that the Defendant stayed
home from work on December 12 because he was not feeling well and because he wanted to
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take a day off. Additionally, it was the only testimony from the defense that the Defendant did
not purchase the sleeping pills (Tr. 1222, Line 14 to 1223, Line 2).
Paragraphs 8 to 18 of the Defendant's affidavit deal with the events of December 16,
1991, when the Defendant wrote the note to Dawn giving her the house and setting out a list of
things she was to do.

This is critical because the prosecution, using Dawn's testimony,

theorized that the Defendant was suicidal and was giving her "everything" in contemplation of
committing suicide. The State was allowed to introduce Dawn's testimony and that of her father
that Joe was thought to be suicidal. The Defense had no affirmative testimony on the issue. To
counter that argument in front of the trial court, the prosecution represented:
. . . In large part the statements of the Defendant corroborate
and substantiate the evidence presented by the State and
the defense regarding those events. . . .
R. 667-68. The State then recited from the opening statement of Defense Counsel as to the
defense's theory. Theory is not evidence. Although the Defendant testified that he was not
suicidal, he also testified that he had no detailed memory of this time period (Tr. 1232, Lines
9 to 12). To characterize to the trial court that explicit testimony about separating, how he was
not walking away without any property but in fact, was planning how to move the items he
wanted, is important testimony is substantiate his claim that the note was written because the
parties intended to separate and not because of a threat of suicide. The evidence would have
also helped the defense in arguing to the jury that when Dawn finally said under crossexamination that she thought he would be back in a day or so, that was really the sentiment of
the discussion between her and the Defendant. Instead, the emphasis of the evidence was that
Joe was suicidal and had refused help from the "elders" and was out the door to end it all by

58

suicide. The State's equating of argument and theories to evidence is ridiculous. Because of the
amnesia, all the defense had was theories and that does not equate to evidence and to a plausible
explanation of what really happened.
Paragraphs 19 to 53 (R. 654-59), deal with the events from when Mr. Jiron called Shelly
for help because of car problems to the flash of light, fire, loss of control of the vehicle and Mr.
Jiron blacking out. The argument of the State to the trial court on this issue is the most blatant
disregard of the state of the record:
Paragraphs 45 through 53 are an attempt by the Defendant to
explain how Shelly Jiron could have died accidently. The
defense presented evidence and argued extensively to the jury
that Shelly Jiron died during the fire and that the fire
started accidentally. Expert testimony was presented and the
argument were fully developed. The evidence presented now
by Joe Jiron is merely cumulative of that theory already
presented to the jury.
R. 666.
The fact is that there was no evidence as to a) why the Defendant called Shelly for help;
b) why the parties ended up in Spanish Fork and disregarded the repair of the defendant's car;
c) why the Defendant made two bank withdrawals; d) how the trip to Wendover evolved; e) the
discussion about getting one room together; f) the events that took place, including the
intimacies, at Wendover; g) the events that took place in their travels from Wendover to the
"second site;" h) the reason the parties stopped at the second site and an explanation of the
reclined seat, the toilet paper, the cigarettes, matches and other physical evidence found at that
location; i) an explanation for the dislodging of the gasoline can; and j) a concrete sensible
explanation of how the gas spilled, why Shelly took of her top, why the car went off the road
at full speed and how the death and injuries occurred.
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All of this testimony would be new and would give the jury evidence of what occurred
as opposed to theorizing by the experts. For example, the testimony of Mr. Halladay that the
gas spillage, in his mind, showed a deliberate spill by the arm of a person in the driver's seat
pouring gas from the back to the front could be made consistent with the Defendant's
explanation. The static electricity emitted by a wool sweater as it was pulled over Shelly's head
is consistent with Mr. Halladay's testimony.
In summary, the vacuum created by only patches of evidence and expert hypothecation
could be replaced with evidence from the only person who could testify to the facts.
Additionally, any image of the defendant, because of his failure to remember and explain the
events would be eliminated. In examining the Defendant's affidavit, one thing is for sure, the
evidence is not cumulative. The trial court erred in so ruling and the State, by it's summary of
the evidence misguided the trial court.
The trial court did not rule that the proffered evidence was not "newly discovered"
evidence and therefore only the issues of whether the evidence was cumulative and would have
lead to a different result at trial need to be addressed on appeal (R. 680).
In addressing the issue, this Court in State v. Duncan. 102 Utah 449, 132 P.2d 121, 125
(1942): stated:
Where disinterested testimony on the vital point in a case
is very scant, newly discovered testimony on that point
appearing from affidavits to be apparently reliable. . .
and it appears that such evidence would change the result,
a new trial should be granted. While the granting or refusing
of the motion lies within the sound discretion of the court,
where there is a grave suspicion that justice may have been
miscarried because of the lack of enlightenment on a vital
point which new evidence will apparently supply, and the other
elements attendant on obtaining a new trial are present, it
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would be an abuse of sound discretion not to grant the same.
See also: State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 188 (Utah 1990); State v. Ames. 112 Idaho 144, 730
P.2d 1064 (App. 1986); State v. Chavez. 87 N.M. 38, 528 P.2d 897, 899 (1974); Jensen v.
Logan. 89 Utah 347, 57 P.2d 708, 723 (1936).
In State v. James. 781 P.2d 781 (Utah 1991), the defendant made a motion for a new
trial on the basis of a piece of evidence obtained from a Mr. Lisner, an inmate at the Utah State
Prison, who testified that Ronald Peterson, a key witness for the prosecution, had told him he
had fabricated his testimony at trial to obtain better treatment from the State on his case. Id. at
793. In reversing the trial court's denial of the motion for a new trial, the Court stated:
. . . We disagree. Our review of the evidence presented
in the case shows that evidence of an intentional or knowing
killing, while sufficient, is not overwhelming or compelling.
Without the evidence of a plan to kill the child which can
be derived from Peterson's testimony, the evidence of an
intentional or knowing killing is scant and susceptible
to differing interpretations. . . Without Peterson's
testimony. . . it is probable that the jury would have had
a reasonable doubt as to whether defendant had the requisite
intent to commit murder.
Id at 795.
It is respectfully submitted that the Defendant's state of mind from December 12 to
December 17, together with the reasoning behind the movements of Shelly and Joe on December
16 and 17, 1991, are pieces of the puzzle in this case upon which the attorneys, experts and
jurors could only speculate. The events at the "second site" and events leading to the fire are
devoid of any testimony and evidence other that what was found at the scene. The Defendant's
testimony, establishing that there is a plausible explanation for the events including the fire and
death, fill a void that cries out in this case to be filled. The difference between the speculation
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of experts, theories of attorneys and direct evidence of a person who was there is clear and
requires the granting of a new trial.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT THE
THE DEFENDANT A NEW TRIAL BASED UPON
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT.
A. The Actions Constituting Prosecutorial Misconduct.
The State had always maintained in this case that Mr. Jiron the Defendant, had caused
the death of Shelly Jiron prior to the time that the parties left the "second site." It was the
State's contention that Shelly Jiron was dead when the Defendant left the "second site" on his
way down the road to where the car went off the highway and finally ended up in the gully. The
opening statement given by the prosecution leaves no question about the State's theory:
The evidence that will be presented to you will demonstrate
Joe and Shelly were alive and together at the Wendover motel.
They were alive and together at this other scene because Joe
doesn't smoke. Someone was smoking and putting cigarettes
out at that scene. That car was there, and they were there.
When they left that scene. Shelly was deceased at the accident.
(Emphasis added)
Tr. 53, Lines 15 to 22.
Finally, the medical examiner will tell you that there were
injuries to Shelly's body. Shelly dies - the medical examiner
will tell you that she dies by asphyxiation, lack of oxygen. He
will tell you that there were some terrible injuries to
her body, serious and severe bruising to her back, between
her shoulder blades, which would not have killed her but would
have disabled her. There were injuries consistent with
strangulation or death by asphyxiation. (Emphasis added.)
Tr. 55, Line 17 to 58, Line 2.
The medical examiner will tell you. . .And his conclusion
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was that she was deceased prior to the fire. (Emphasis added.)
Tr. 56, Line 25 to 57, Line 10.
Now, that's a general summary. There will be more detail.
There will be more items of evidence that we'll put together
to match up, but that will be the evidence principally in the
case: the fact the defendant was suicidal; he wanted to die:
he went out of his way to meet with this victim; he took her to
Wendover; they were alone together; he set that fire. And the
evidence will be that he killed Shelly Jiron and that he set the
fire in order to kill himself and to destroy the body.
(Emphasis added.)
Tr. 57, Lines 11 to 20.
After arguing in closing argument the same theory that Shelly Jiron was killed by the
Defendant before he left the second site, the prosecutor then made the following statements,
Even if you disregard Dr. Leis' testimony that Shelly was
deceased before the fire, and accept the defense medical
testimony that she may have died as a result of the fire,
that doesn't help the Defendant, because he set the fire.
(Emphasis added.)
Transcript of Closing Arguments, page 15, Lines 4 to 9.
Just for supposing. Throw out all of the evidence you
have heard about her being deceased prior to the fire. Now
throw out all of the evidence that you heard about time of
death. Throw it all out and forget it for a minute. Joe is
still guilty because he set the fire.
(Emphasis added).
Transcript of Closing Arguments, page 72, Lines 9 to 14.
Our case doesn't fail if you decide that she was alive
at the time of the fire. But that's not the case. The
evidence doesn't demonstrate that. Neither does the State
have to prove a particular motive. We have to prove that the
defendant knowingly and intentionally killed Shelly. . . .
Transcript of Closing Arguments, page 73, Line 23 to page 74, Line 4.
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B. The Objection and the Trial Court's Ruling.
Counsel for the Defendant objected to the argument at the time it was made (Closing
Argument Transcript Page. 73, Lines 3 to 6). The trial court, instead of entertaining the
defense's objection at the time, instructed the defense to renew the objection at a later time (R.
597-98). In response to written motions requesting a new trial, the court ruled:
In light of the Court's instructions, the Court does not believe
that the Jury could have been misled as a result of the said
statement of the prosecutor. It is noted that counsel for Defendant alleges in his memorandum that some of the Jurors were in fact
so misled, but there is no evidence to support such a contention in
the record.
R. 672-73.
C. The Trial Court's Error.
In Utah, a trial court may grant a new trial "in the interest of justice if there is any error
or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party. U.R.C.P.
24(a). State v. Owens. 753 P.2d 976 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Additionally,
It is the rule that if improper statements are made by
counsel during a trial, it is the duty of opposing counsel
to register a contemporaneous objection thereto so that
the court may make a correction by proper instruction and,
if the offense is sufficiently prejudicial, declare a mistrial.
State v. Tillman. 750 P.2d 546, 561 (Utah 1987); State v. Cabututan. 213 Utah Adv. Rep 18,
21 (Utah 1993).
There is no question that it is improper for a prosecutor to refer to or argue on the basis
of facts outside the record and to mislead the jury as to inferences warranted by the evidence.
State v. Ferguson. 803 P.2d 676 (N.M. App. 1990). The Utah Supreme Court has stated that
prosecutorial misconduct constitutes reversible error when the misconduct "call[s] to the attention
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of the jurors matters they would not be justified in considering in determining their verdict and,
under the circumstances of a particular case, the error is substantial and prejudicial such that
there is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence, there would have been a more favorable
result for the defendant." State v. Tillman, 750 P2d 546 (Utah 1987).
The problem with the argument made by the prosecutor in closing argument is that it
misled the jury as to the legal implications of their factual findings. In essence the State argued
that the jurors could still find the Defendant guilty of both Arson and Homicide even if they
found that the Defendant killed Shelly Jiron by setting the fire. That inference is clearly plain
error and was not cured by the jury instructions.
Instructions 7, 8, 9 and 10 (Addendum, Exhibit 2) outlined the elements of the crimes
with which the Defendant was charged (R.492-95).

However, although the instructions

accurately state the elements of each of the crimes, the instructions do not deal with the
circumstance of a factual finding that the homicide was caused by the Defendant's act of Arson.
The trial court, upon hearing the objection to the prosecution's argument should have tried to
cure the error by instruction, declared a mistrial or allowed a new trial.
Utah Code Annotated 76-5-203 outlines the circumstances comprising second degree
Criminal Homicide. In this case, the Defendant was charged with section (a) in that he allegedly
"intentionally and knowingly" caused the death of another. However, section (d) makes it clear
that if a person, while in the commission of a myriad of crimes, including arson, causes the
death of another, that also is second degree Capital Homicide. Accordingly, the jury should
have been instructed that if the State was contending that it's theory was alternatively, that Shelly
was killed by the Defendant as a result of the Arson, the jury could not find the Defendant guilty
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of Arson as a separate offense in that Arson would then be a necessary element of second degree
Criminal Homicide.
The trial court's failure to take any action allowed the jury to believe that it could convict
the Defendant of both crimes even if they found that the cause of death was Arson perpetrated
by the Defendant, which is clearly contrary to the law and obviously violates the substantial
rights of the Defendant.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY INSTRUCT
THE JURY BASED UPON THE PROSECUTOR'S
STATEMENTS DURING CLOSING
ARGUMENTS.
The comments of the prosecutor during closing argument that are set out in Point III
either constitute inappropriate comments as to the legal inferences that could be drawn from the
evidence or the court, as argued in this point, failed to properly instruct the jury.
The Defendant was charged with Second Degree Capital Homicide in violation of Utah
Code Annotated 76-5-201 and 203 (1953 as Amended) in that he, as set out in section 203(a),
intentionally and knowingly caused the death of another. Defendant was also charged with
Arson, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated 76-6-102 (1953 as
Amended) in that he intentionally and unlawfully damages property of another. (R. 40).
There is no question that the State theorized, to the time of the closing arguments, that
the Defendant killed the victim at the "second site" and then subsequently, in an attempt to
commit suicide, set the car on fire. Under that factual scenario, the jury was properly instructed
as to the elements of the crime. However, when the State changed it's theory of the case in
closing arguments and argued to the jury that they could find the Defendant guilty even if Shelly
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was alive at the time the fire was set and in fact, her death was intentionally caused by the
Defendant setting the car on fire, the instructions to the jury no longer accurately represent the
law.
Utah Code Annotated 76-5-203(d) (1953 as Amended), provides that a person is guilty
of only Second Degree Criminal Homicide if the actor:
while in the commission, attempted commission,
or immediate flight from the commission or
attempted commission of aggravated robbery,
robbery, . . . aggravated arson, arson,. . .
causes the death of another. . . .(Emphasis
added.)
Therefore, if the court did not chose to cure the statements of the prosecution by mistrial,
the granting of a new trial, the only remaining alternative, was to cure the problem by
instruction. The trial court should have instructed the jury that if they found that Shelly Jiron
was killed by the actions of the Defendant in starting the fire, they could return a guilty verdict
on the Criminal Homicide count, but could not return a verdict for Arson because Arson is a
necessary element of Criminal Homicide under those facts. As the instructions were given (R.
492-95), there was nothing that instructed the jury concerning the State's new found theory that
the murder was committed as an instrumentality of Arson.
This Court has stated that "the trial court is obligated to instruct the jury on a lesser
included offense only when there is a 'rational basis for the verdict acquitting the defendant of
the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense'" State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d
460, 462 (Utah 1990); State v. Baker. 671 P.2d 152, 156 (Utah 1983). Additionally, in order
to protect a defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial, "a defendant's requested lesser
included offense must be given when there is some evidence which support the theory asserted
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by Defendant." State v. Standiford. 769 P.2d 254, 266 (Utah 1988); State v. Day. 815 P.2d
1345, 1348 (Utah App. 1991).
The record in this case indicates that the defense objected to the comments at the time
of trial and based part of the Motion for a New Trial on the error (Tr. 73, Lines 3 to 6; R. 59697). However, the failure to correct the statement of the prosecution or cure the error by
instruction constitutes plain error. To establish plain error, the appellant must establish that a)
an error exists; b) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and c) the error is
harmful, i.e. absent the error, there is reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for
the appellant, or phrased differently, the confidence in the verdict is undermined. State v. Verde,
770 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah 1989); State v. Bell. 770 P.2d 100, 105-06 (Utah 1988): State v.
Knight. 734 P.2d 913, 919-20 (Utah 1987).
In this case, given the change in theory by the State, the jury could have found that 1)
the Defendant committed the homicide and then, at a later time set the fire (under which
scenario, the instructions are adequate); 2) the Defendant committed the homicide by setting the
fire (which scenario is not dealt with in the instructions; 3) the Defendant did not commit the
murder or did not commit the arson (which findings are dealt within the instructions). It is
impossible to decipher from the verdict whether the jury found the homicide was committed
before the arson or at the time of the arson. Given the theory submitted to the jury by the State,
over the defendant's objection, it was plain error not to submit instructions to the jury explaining
that under the State's new found theory, Arson is an included element of Homicide and that the
evidence under that scenario could not support a separate conviction of arson.
POINT V
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THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE
AND TESTIMONY OF THE ANAL INJURIES
TO THE VICTIM.
The defense filed a Motion in Limine requesting the court to exclude testimony and
pictorial evidence of the anal injuries of the victim (R. 60-66, Exhibit 12, Addendum, Exhibit
3). The court denied the motion (R. 340-44).
As carefully established in the Statement of Facts, there was continual reference to the
anal injuries throughout the course of the trial. In fact, the prosecutor in his rebuttal remarks
to the jury indicated that Shelly had been sodomized (Tr. 77, Line 1).
The fact is that the uncontroverted evidence from Dr. Leis, the state's medical expert,
was that the anal injuries were sustained three to four hours before death, were probably
incurred during sex by the insertion of a fist or the like and had absolutely nothing to do with
the cause of death.

The pictures of the victim's anus are gruesome and were unfairly

emphasized and exhibited to the jury. There is not a shred of evidence offered by the State
indicating that the minor injuries were not suffered during consensual sex.
Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without
the evidence." Rule 401 U.R.E. The establishment that the parties engaged in consensual sex
both in Wendover and during sex, the victim suffered some minor anal tears is not relevant to
intent and does not establish an increased probability that the Defendant committed the murder.
The fact that the anal injuries were three to four hours old at the time of death puts the place
of injury in Wendover. The court's reasoning that it showed intent or motive simply was not
borne out by the evidence at trial (R. 343).
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Even if the anal injury evidence was admissible, the court must consider the gruesome
nature of the photograph and it's essential evidentiary value. State v. Garcia. 663 P.2d 60, 64
(1984). Rule 403 of the Rules of Evidence provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice . . .or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence. . . .
On appeal, the Court must determine whether the trial court's finding that the evidence
was admissible was "beyond the limits of reasonability," and that there is a reasonable
likelihood, absent the error of an outcome more favorable to the Defendant. Sate v. Hamilton,
827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992); State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 120-21 (Utah 1989); State
v. Cloud. 722 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1986).
In this case, it is respectfully submitted that the constant reference to the anal injuries and
anal sex in Utah County, although totally unrelated to the alleged crime had an "unusual
propensity to unfairly prejudice, inflame, or mislead the jury. State v. Dibello. 780 P.2d 1221,
1229 (Utah 1989); State v. Laffertv. 749 P.2d 1239, 1256 (Utah 1988). In accordance with the
decisions of this Court, that finding then places a presumption that the evidence's potential for
unfair prejudice is presumed to outweigh it probativeness, and the burden is on the proponent
to show that the evidence has unusual probative value. State v. Dunn. 208 Utah Adv. Rep. 100,
109 (1993); Laffertv, supra, at 1256.
Given the facts of this case and the State's evidence, the testimony and evidence of the
minor anal injuries blown up and paraded in front of the jury for the entire length of the trial,
was prejudicial and distorted the deliberate process and skewed the trial's outcome. Dibello,
supra., at 1229; Laffertv, supra., at 1256; Cloud, supra., at 753; Dunn, supra., at 109.
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There was simply nothing to be drawn from the injury other than the fact that the parties
had sex in Wendover and at the "second site" which facts were established by a number of
exhibits and testimony.
POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN ADMITTING
EVIDENCE AT TRIAL. WHICH WHEN CONSIDERED
TOGETHER CONSTITUTES CUMULATIVE ERROR.
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court committed error with regard to a number
of evidentiary ruling, which either entitle the Defendant to a new trial based upon their
individual nature or, alternatively were cumulatively harmful.

Under the cumulative error

doctrine, the Court will reverse if the "cumulative effect of the several errors undermines [the
Court's] confidence. State v. Dunn, supra, at 114; Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp.,
801 P.2d 920, 928 (Utah 1990); accord State v. Johnson. 784 P.2d 1135, 1146; (Utah 1989);
State v. Ellis. 748 P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1987); State v. RammeL 721 P.2d 498, 501-02 (Utah
1986).
A. The Love Letter From Norman to Shelly Jiron Was
Inadmissible,
The Defendant filed a Motion in Limine requesting that the court exclude the letter
(R.56-60). A copy of the love letter is attached in the Addendum as Exhibit 4. The court denied
the motion (R. 330-33). In ruling on the motion, the trial court held that the letter would be
admissible only if it was established that the Defendant had read the letter (R. 332).
Accordingly, the court stated in it's ruling:
However, as the Defendant rightly remarks, whatever relevance
the letter may have toward establishing intent or motive is
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conditioned upon the defendant's knowing of or reading
the letter. (Emphasis added.)
R. 332.
Rule 104(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence establishes that "where the relevancy of
evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or
subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the
condition." Defendant acknowledges that it is the duty of the trial court to determine whether
the trier of fact could reasonable find the conditional fact, by the preponderance of the evidence.
Huddleston v. United States. 485 U.S. 686, 690 (1988).
In this case, the forensic workup on the letter failed to produce any fingerprint or other
evidence that the Defendant ever saw the love letter from Norman. The evidence established
that Shelly picked the letter up at her mother's house when she was picking up the children.
There was no evidence that there was any discussion about the letter either at Shelly's mother's
house or at Abelina Hunick's house, where the children were dropped off. The only evidence
is that the letter was found opened and was found in Shelly's handbag.
The Defendant contends that without more, there is not any evidence, let alone a
preponderance, that the Defendant saw the letter. There was no testimony that the Defendant
had looked in Shelly's handbag previously or was seen in a circumstance where he was
examining her purse. The condition the court acknowledges was necessary as a condition
precedent to admission was never furnished. To understand the prejudicial effect, one only has
to review the Statement of Facts. The love letter is the only piece of evidence that the State can
rely upon to show why the fun and happy attitudes that Shelly and the Defendant had towards
each other when they visited Shelly's mother, Joe's sister, the casinos and motel in Wendover
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suddenly changed. Without the letter, the State is left with its supposition that Joe was suicidal
which would change the complexion of the case completely.
B. The Trial Court Erred in Admitting Evidence of
Marital Communication.
The Defendant filed a Motion in Limine to Suppress Dawn Jiron's testimony of the
events that occurred from December 12,1991 through December 16, 1991 including the contents
of the handwritten note signed by the Defendant relating to the personal possessions that were
to be returned and the disposition of the house (R. 300-321). In it's ruling the trial court found
that the handwritten note and the conversations between the Defendant and his wife, Dawn, met
the Requirement of Rule 502 of the Utah Rules of Evidence in that it was a marital
communication and was confidential in that "it is made privately by any person to his or her
spouse and is not intended for disclosure to any other person." Rule 502(b)(1) URE. The court
noted that the marital privilege applies to written as well as oral communication (R. 348 citing
State v. Galloway, 680 P.2d 268 (Kan. 1984).
The court finding that the statements and handwritten notes were marital communication
and confidential, ruled that they were admissible only by an exception to the privilege regarding
marital communications, Rule 502(b)(4)(B). Specifically, the court ruled that the communication
was not privileged if "made in whole or part to enable or aid anyone to commit, to plan to
commit, or conceal a crime or tort." (R. 348-50). The logic apparently is that because the
Defendant told his wife he was quitting and went through the disposition of property, those
statements and the note are in furtherance of a plan to commit suicide and murder Shelly Jiron.
The evidence at trial failed to produce any evidence that would establish the court's
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position. Even Dawn admitted on the stand that she expected Joe to come back in a day or two.
Further, what possible relevance can the disposition of Joe's property and his breakup with
Dawn have on a plan to murder Shelly.
The fatal flaw in the case is the absence of any evidence that links the separation with
Dawn, and the note relative to property into a motive or intent to kill Shelly, who is a stranger
to the whole scenario.
The State by being allowed to introduce the love letter, the communications with Dawn
and the note giving her the house was able to weave a cloth of supposition that was based
entirely on other inadmissible evidence or speculation.
CONCLUSION
The evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to support a conviction in this case. Even
when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State, there was not sufficient
evidence that Shelly died by criminal means or that the Defendant acted with knowledge or
intention.
The testimony that the Defendant can now provide, as set out in his affidavit in support
of his Motion for a New Trial based upon newly discovered evidence provides new testimony
about aspects of the case that are crucial and have previously required the witnesses and jury to
speculate. The court's finding that the evidence was cumulative is clearly contradicted by the
record in this case and a new trial should be allowed to present the trier of fact with all of the
evidence.
The statement of the prosecution in closing argument changed the theory of the case.
The Defendant was entitled to a mistrial, a curing instruction or a new set of jury instructions
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outlining the options the jury had based upon the theory. Specifically, the failure of the
instructions to provide that the jury could not convict the Defendant of Arson if it determined
that he knowingly and intentionally killed Shelly by fire was essential.
Finally, the trial court committed serious error with regard to key pieces of evidence.
The Defendant was entitled to ruling that the evidence was inadmissible and this court, based
upon the prejudicial effect of the evidence and improper foundation and a lack of relevance
should overturn the conviction.
In sum, this case should be remanded for a new trial with instructions as to the
admissibility of the questioned evidence and testimony.
DATED this {±L day of January, 1994.

Steven B. Killpa$^Esq
Attorney for Appellant
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I certify that ^ ^ copies of the Appellant's Brief were mailed, postage prepaid to Ms.
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day of January, 1994.
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ADDENDUM
1. Defendant's Affidavit in Support of Defendant's Motion for a New Trial
2. Trial Court's Jury Instructions Numbered One Thru Ten
3. Photograph of Shelly Jiron's Anal Injury
4. Love Letter From Norman to Shelly Jiron
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EXHIBIT 1
Defendant's Affidavit in Support of Defendant's Motion for a New Trial

DEAN N. ZABRISKIE #3599
Attorney for Defendant
3507 North University Avenue, Suite 370
Jamestown Square, Hanover Building
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 375-7680
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
AFFIDAVIT OF JOE F. JIRON

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOE F. JIRON

Case No. 921400242

Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH

)
:SS
COUNTY OF UTAH )
Affiant, being

first duly sworn, deposes

and

states as

follows:
1.

I am the defendant in the above-entitled matter.

2.

At the time of the trial I had no memory of the incidents

immediately prior to and including the accident on December 17,
1991, west of Utah Lake, which provides the basis for the aboveentitled action.
3.

My memory has, to an extent, returned as it relates to

the incidents of and surrounding December 17, 1991, including the
precursors to the accident. The incidents I recall are as follow.
4.

I recall that on or around December 6, 1991, I had a

dental appointment which I left work for, but which my wife, Dawn,
had cancelled.

Upon learning that the appointment was cancelled,
1
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I stayed home because I was not feeling well and because it felt
nice to have a day off.
5.

While I was home on December 6, I drank at most three

shots of scotch and ate some pizza, after which I took a nap.
6.

I awoke from the nap and vomited on the bed, which my

wife cleaned up for me.
7.

I never at any time took any sleeping pills at, or

immediately prior to, this time; nor do I recall ever purchasing
any sleeping pills whatsoever on or immediately prior to December
6th.
8.

On the morning of December 16, 1991, I called my employer

to find out where the day's job site would be and then left to that
site.
9.

Upon arriving at the job site, I looked over the job and

decided what I needed to finish the job, whereupon I noticed that
I had no extension cord.
10.

I returned home to retrieve one.

Prior to this time I had been thinking about separating

from my wife, Dawn, due to our inability to get along; and at this
time, on my way home to retrieve the extension cord, I continued to
think about ending my marriage with Dawn.
11.

Upon arriving at my home, I retrieved the extension cord

but left it by the front door.

At this time I decided that I

should end the marriage.
12.

I subsequently went around the house to determine which

items I would take with me, as I was about to leave Dawn.
13.

I asked Dawn to get a pencil and paper so that she would
2
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write down a few things that I wished for her to do for me.

I had

her write them so that she would not forget about them.
14.

The

notes that Dawn

evidence in this Court.

took have

already

been used

as

This note included reminders for Dawn to

return money to my mother; to tell a friend, Steve, about his
tools; and to tell another friend, Ed, to keep my screwgun.
15.

After Dawn had finished writing down the things that I

wanted her to do for me, I told her that I had had enough of the
mind games and other difficulties that had incessantly accompanied
our marriage.
meaning that

As I told her this, I believe I did say, "I quit,"
I was

leaving her and planned on dissolving

the

marriage.
16.

I then went out to the car and took everything out of it

in order to load it again with my things that I wanted to take from
the house.
17.

I cannot recall if it was at this time or at a later time

that Dawn asked me, "What about the house?"
time, I then told her she could have it.
have it just like that."

If it was at this

She asked, "How can I

I responded by writing on the paper she

had had earlier that she could have the house and whatever I left
in it.
18.

I then left to get some gas and fill the air shocks of

the car in order to be able to later haul my belongings from the
house.

I then realized I had no gas key, so I returned home and

retrieved the gas key.

In the alternative to paragraph 16, this

may be the time that Dawn asked me, "What about the house?"

3
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this was the time that she did so, then this was also the time that
I wrote on her paper that she could have the house, etc.
19.

I returned to my car and left again, but instead of

filling up with gas, I just drove around to vent my anger, calm
down, and think clearly about whether I actually wanted to end my
marriage with Dawn.
20.

In Springville, my car began having problems, whereupon

I drove to a vacant lot, where the car stalled.

I tried but failed

to restart the car.
21.

Instead of calling Dawn to tell her that my car had

stalled, I called Shelly Conk, my ex-wife.

We discussed the

possibility that the car might be out of gas, and Shelly agreed to
come and help me.
22.

I then went to a nearby bank to withdraw some money and

waited for Shelly.
23.

Upon Shelly's arrival, we

searched

for a gas can,

checking a couple stores in Springville with no luck.
24.

We eventually found a gas can at a K-Mart in Spanish

Fork.
25.

We then drove for nostalgic reasons to my old home in

Spanish Fork where I was raised, and then to another previous home
in Payson.
26.

Shelly then mentioned that she had been in Wendover the

week before, and we agreed that it would be fun to go there.

We

stopped at a bank in Payson to get more cash, and then we called my
sister, Abelina, to see if she would watch our kids.
4
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conversation as I overheard it, I assumed Abelina consented.
27.

We then returned back to Springville and stopped to fill

the gas can and Shelly's car.

I filled the can and while I started

to place the nozzle into the car Shelly placed the lid on the
container and placed it into her car on the floor of the passenger
side of the back seat.
28.

At this point I could not find the key to my car.

Shelly

and I just laughed and decided to leave my car where it was.
29.

We proceeded

to Shelly's mother's house

in Orem

and

retrieved our kids, whom we then dropped off at Abelina's house.
30.

We then went to Wendover.

On our way to Wendover, I

found the key to my car, and I placed the key in my sock because
the key would easily fall out of my pant pockets.
31.

When we arrived in Wendover, we went to a Casino and an

older man in his sixties or seventies checked our identifications.
We then played the nickle slots and had mixed drinks.
32.

After a while, Shelly said she was tired due to a party

she had gone to the night before, so we decided to get a room for
the night.

I assumed that she and Danny Kinder were still going

together, but she said that such was no longer the case and that we
could get a room together next door.
33.

Shelly drove us into the hotel's driveway, and I went in

and checked out the room.
34.

Once inside the hotel room, we watched television, made

love, and slept.
35.

The

following morning, December

17, 1991, I went

to
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shower while Shelly called Abelina.

Shelly joined me and we made

love again.
36.

Upon leaving the shower, we heard the phone ring and

Shelly said it meant that we had to check out.

At this point

Shelly took a picture of me.
37.
door.

We gathered our things and began going to the Casino next

Shelly needed something from the car so we went to the car

first.

It was at this point that I noticed the damaged windshield

wiper on Shelly's car, which I removed and placed in the car.
38.

We used our hotel coupons and ate breakfast, then we

played more slots.

We became tired of the Casino, so we left and

began on our way to Abelinafs house.

Shelly asked that I drive

because she was still a little tired.
39.

Shelly told me to take the Tooele exit heading south

because it was faster to Abelina's place.
40.

I took the exit.

We stopped at a log-cabin type gas station and used the

restrooms and bought some junk food.
41.

Later, we noticed that we were getting low on gas, so we

stopped at an old station and got $10.00-worth of gas.

Not long

after this, it began to get dark.
42.

As we continued, we began to talk about my leaving Dawn

and how Shelly and I might be able to fix things between us.

We

both got excited about the prospects.
43.

When we thought we were getting close to Abelina's house,

Shelly suggested we stop for a while.

We had seen a dirt road

shortly before, so we turned back and went up the dirt road and
6
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turned off the car.
44.

The

car

kept

rolling

a

little,

even

though

the

transmission was in gear and the emergency brake was up. So Shelly
held the brake pedal while I got a rock to put in front of the
front left tire.
45.

Upon re-entering the car, we continued talking, and

eventually had sex.

This particular time, however, the sex was

especially passionate and vigorous with myself lying on the fullyreclined front passenger seat and Shelly on top of me.

It is my

suspicion that it was at this time that the cap to the gas can,
which was directly below me on the floor of the back seat, became
dislodged.
46.

After sex, we opened the car door because it was very hot

and fogged up in the car.

Shelly went outside and went to the

bathroom. When she returned, I lit a cigarette for Shelly, and she
smoked.
47.

I exited the car and sat on the hood of the car, playing

with the book of matches I had used to light Shelly's cigarette.
Shelly came out and cuddled with me for a while, but we soon became
cold and returned to the car.
48.

Once inside the car, I started the engine and Shelly

turned on the defroster to clear the windows. As I backed out and
began to drive over the dirt road, Shelly mentioned that the car
smelled strongly of gasoline.

I agreed and remembered the can of

gasoline behind and under the still-reclined passenger seat.
49.

As I started to pull out onto the main dirt road, I
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reached back to check the gas can, but I could not discern whether
it was still sealed.

So I grabbed the container and pulled it out

from under the front seat and lifted it up and over into the front
seat area.

Shelly shouted, "Oh shit!" and I realized that I had

been spilling more gas, so I quickly pulled the container over to
my side of the car.

Some gasoline spilled on me, feeling very

cold, like cold water.
50.

At this point, Shelly took the can and did something with

it, though I did not see what she did with it.
51.
skin.

We both began to notice that the gas was burning our

Shelly said that we were already near Abelina's house, so we

should just hurry up and try to get there as fast as we could.
52.
road.

I went very fast through the remaining portion*of dirt

By the time we turned onto the main highway again, I was

already in fifth gear.
53.

Shelly was complaining about the burning, and it appeared

that she was trying to wipe the gas off of herself.
appeared to remove her top.
my eye.

Shelly then

I saw a slight flash in the corner of

Then I saw a brighter flash, and I saw that Shelly's arms

were slightly raised and that Shelly was sliding off of the seat.
A ball of fire rushed up high towards my face.

I closed my eyes,

let go of the steering wheel and went to reach for Shelly.
to breathe, but I could not get any air.
noise and my ears popped.

I tried

I heard a slight hissing

I then felt the car tip to the right and

I jammed my foot somewhere next to the gas pedal.

I was thrown

back to the left side of the car, whereupon I raised my hand up in

8

front of m e and held m y breath.

I felt a few big bounces and then

I blanked out.
DATED t h i s

1

day of
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EXHIBIT 2
Trial Court's Jury Instructions Numbered One Through Ten

DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUN1
STATE OF UTAH

n
o>

STATE OF UTAH,

&.-•.

"%

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No

921400242

JOE F. JIRON,

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY

Defendant.
MEMBERS OF THE JURY:
INSTRUCTION NO. 1
It is the duty of the Court to instruct you in the law
that applies to this case, and it is your duty as jurors to follow
the law as the Court states it to you, regardless of what you
personally believe the law is or ought to be.

On the other hand,

it is your exclusive province to determine the facts in the case,
and to consider and weigh the evidence for that purpose.
The authority thus vested in you is not an arbitrary
power, but must be exercised with sincere judgment, sound
discretion, and in accordance with rules of law stated to you.
INSTRUCTION NO. 2
The fact that the defendant has been charged with a
crime and has been held to answer thereto is not to be regarded as
any evidence of his guilt and no inference or presumption adverse
to him should be drawn because of those facts.

DO 2

INSTRUCTION NO.

Jl

In so far as you are concerned, you may consider as
evidence whatever is admitted in the trial as part of the record,
whether

it

be

the

testimony

of

witnesses

or

an

article

or

document marked as an exhibit, or other matter admitted, such as
an admission, agreement, or stipulation.
At times I have ruled upon^objections to the admission
or

certain

things

admissibility

into

evidence.

of evidence

Questions

relating

to

are solely questions of law and you

must not concern yourself with my reasons for ruling as I have,
or draw any
party.
court

inferences therefrom in favor of or against either

In admitting evidence to which an objection is made, the
does

not

determine

what

weight

should

be

given

such

evidence; nor does it pass on the credibility of the witness.

As

to any question to which an objection was sustained, you must not
conjecture as to what the answer might have been or as to the
reason for the objection.
Statements,
intended

to

applying

the

help
law,

arguments,

you

in

but

and

remarks

understanding

they

are

not

the

of

counsel

evidence

evidence.

You

are

and

in

should

disregard any such utterance that has no basis in the evidence.
Neither
action, or remark

in

these

that

instructions

nor

I have made during

in

any

ruling,

the course of

this

trial have I intended to interpose any opinion or suggestion as
to how I would resolve any of the issues of this case.

501

You should construe each instruction in the light of
and in harmony with the other instructions and you should apply
the instructions as a whole to the evidence.
the

instructions

are

given

has

no

The order in which

significance

and

is

no

indication of their relative importance.

500

INSTRUCTION NO. J A

It is your duty to consider the evidence all together,
fairly, impartially, conscientiously and without prejudice of any
kind.

You should arrive at your verdict solely upon the evidence

introduced before you upon the trial.

You should not consider nor

be influenced by any evidence offered which was not admitted by
the court; nor are you to consider any evidence given, if the same
was afterwards, by the court, ordered stricken out.
The law forbids you to be governed by mere sentiment,
conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public
feeling.

Both the State of Utah and the defendant have a right to

demand and they do demand and expect that you will conscientiously
and dispassionately consider the weight of the evidence and apply
the law of the case, that you will reach a just verdict regardless
of what the consequences of such verdict may be.

The verdict must

express the individual opinion of each juror.

499

INSTRUCTION NO.

^f

A person charged with a crime is presumed to be
innocent until he is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
The presumption of innocence is not a mere form to be disregarded by the jury at pleasure, but is a substantial,
essential part of the law and is binding upon the jury.
This presumption is a humane provision of the law, intended,
so far as human agency is capable, to guard against the
danger of an innocent person being unjustly punished.
The presumption of innocence must continue to
prevail in the minds of the jury unless and until the jury
is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the
defendant.

And in case of a reasonable doubt as to the

defendant's guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal.

498

INSTRUCTION NO.

J)

In all criminal cases, the State is required to prove
each element of the crime charged against a defendant beyond
a reasonable doubt. This burden of proof is required to be
based only on the legal evidence presented -in court. You
must keep in mind in assessing whether the State has met its
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the burden
never shifts to a defendant to call any witnesses, produce
any evidence or disprove any element of the crime charged.
In the context of the above, you are instructed that a
reasonable doubt is a doubt based on reason and common sense
growing out of the evidence or lack of evidence in this
case.

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not require

proof to an absolute certainty but requires that degree of
proof which satisfies the mind and convinces the
understanding of those who are bound to act conscientiously
upon it.
If, after an impartial consideration of all of the
evidence, you have a reasonable doubt as to a defendant's
guilt, you must acquit that defendant.

If, however, after

such consideration of the evidence you have no reasonable
doubt, you should find such defendant guilty.

INSTRUCTION NO.

b

This is a criminal action brought by the State of Utah against
the defendant in which he is accused by the Information of the
commission of the crime(s) of:
COUNT I:
CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, a First Degree felony, in
violation of 76-5-201 and 203, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as
amended, in that the defendant, on or about December 17, 1991, in
Utah County, Utah, did intentionally and knowingly cause the death
of Shelly Jiron.
COUNT II: ARSON, a itooona Degree felony, in violation of 766-102, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that the defendant,
on or about December 17, 1991, in Utah County, Utah, did unlawfully
and intentionally damage the property of another by means of fire
causing damage in excess of $1,000.
When the defendant was arraigned on this charge he entered a
plea of not guilty, which casts upon the State the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of the
crime charged, which are set forth in Instruction No5- 7 ~f? .
The foregoing instruction is not to be regarded as a statement
of the facts proved in this case, but is to be

considered merely

as a summarized statement of the accusation against the defendant*.

INSTRUCTION NO.

7

4rc

In order for you/find the Defendant guilty of the offense of
Count

I: Criminal Homicide, you must

following

essential

elements

of

the

find that each of the
crime

charged

in

the

Information have been established beyond a reasonable doubt:
1.

That the defendant,

2.

On or about December 17, 1991,

3.

In Utah County, Utah,

4.

Did intentionally and knowingly,

5.

Cause the death of another.

If the State has failed to prove to your satisfaction beyond
a reasonable doubt any one or more of the essential elements of the
crime charged, you should find the defendant not guilty.

But if

the State has proved to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt
all of the essential elements of the offense as set forth above,
then you should find the defendant guilty of the offense charged in
the Information.

INSTRUCTION NO.

#

The mental element required as an element of the offense
charged by the State in this case is that the defendant acted
knowingly or intentionally.
A person engages in conduct knowingly or with knowledge, with
respect to his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct
when he is aware of the nature of his conduct for the existing
circumstances.

A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with

respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
A person engages in conduct intentionally, or with intent or
willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result
of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to
engage in the conduct or cause the result.

INSTRUCTION NO.

^

In order for yoiy*find the Defendant guilty of the offense of
Count II: Arson you must find that each of the following essential
elements

of

the crime charged

in the Information

have been

established beyond a reasonable doubt:
1.

That the defendant,

2.

On or about December 17, 1991,

3.

In Utah County, Utah,

4.

By means of fire or explosives,

5.

Unlawfully,

6.

And intentionally damages,

7.

The property of another,

8. Where the damage caused exceeded $1,000, but was not more
than $5,000 in value.

If the State has failed to prove to your satisfaction beyond
a reasonable doubt any one or more of the essential elements of the
crime charged, you should find the defendant not guilty.

But if

the State has proved to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt
all of the essential elements of the offense as set forth above,
then you should find the defendant guilty of the offense charged in
the Information.

INSTRUCTION NO.
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Photograph of Shelly Jiron's Anal Injury

lixiiiMir i
Love Letter From Norman to Shelly Jiron

f^pv>^

wv*~

/2.//S/9/

%• cud

J f ^
JtrA^y

JLJ'AM"

'/it

